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The paper discusses and revisits some of the most popular stories behind the 2001 
financial crisis in Argentina, i.e. the prolonged overvaluation of the peso owing to the 
Currency Board arrangement, the lack of fiscal adjustment, and the negative external 
environment which triggered a “sudden stop” of capital inflows. In doing so, the paper 
surveys and attempts to make sense of the contradictory theories and explanations 
surrounding these different stories. It also tries to shed some light on one possible 
missing link, that is the growth performance during the Convertibiity period. Finally, the 
paper discusses some important policy issues pertaining to the effects of global financial 
integration, such as capital account opening, exchange rate policies, alternatives to debt 
financing and the role of the international financial institutions.  The central message is 
that the very nature of the Argentine crisis was not fundamentally different from the 
pattern of inconsistent macroeconomic policies which triggered many of the speculative 
attacks against the Peso in the 1970s and the 1980s. Although the problem was for once 
not monetary, the time inconsistency problem of the exchange rate policy followed 
between 1991 and 2001, together with the lack of nationally coherent fiscal and 
development policies, led to a classic debt solvency trap. From this perspective, the 2001 
default does not provide for a new “type” of crisis, although crisis management. This 
being said, the real sector of the economy during the 1990s is certainly one of the most 
overlooked elements in the crisis, and certainly led to overoptimistic expectations about 
the capacity of the Argentine economy to rebound. 
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1. Introduction: Setting the Stage 
 
For long a subscriber to currency and banking crises and an experienced practitioner of 
hyperinflation, Argentina seemed at last to have achieved a remarkable level of price 
stability and growth in the 1990s, prompted by the adoption of a rigid currency board 
system (the so-called “convertibility plan”) in 1991 that enforced the 1-to-1 peg of the 
peso to the dollar. Trade protection was substantially lowered, an ambitious privatization 
program was implemented, and the economy was growing rapidly: Argentina was made 
out to be a model of the paying-off of market reforms. Considerable amounts of FDI 
flowed into the country, most specifically from privatizations, and Argentina was able to 
float large issues of medium and longer maturity debt in world credit markets at 
comparatively modest spreads over US treasuries. Even better, for the first time in 
Argentina’s convoluted postwar financial history, the 1995 banking crisis which followed 
the “Tequila” crisis in Mexico, did not result in a peso devaluation. The currency board 
resisted the shock, as well as the spillover effects of the East-Asian and Russian crises in 
1997-1998. Even after the devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999, the 
Argentine economy seemed to be able to cushion the shock. However, the tide shifted in 
2001 with the entire collapse of the financial sector, pushing the country into external 
debt default. Domestic savings have been confiscated through fierce “pesofication”, and 
the population is taking the hit. But Argentina’s story remains puzzling: how can a 
country with a 10-year track record of price stability,  virtually no inflation, a 
“reasonable” debt ratio of 54% of GDP (by Maastricht standards) and seemingly tolerable 
fiscal and current account deficit levels, hit the wall so quickly ? How can a country, 
which had been under close IMF scrutiny since the beginning of the currency board 
arrangement, all of a sudden fall in disgrace ?      
 
The case of Argentina has been discussed at large by scholars and experts, but no 
consensus has emerged so far. This is hardly surprising. After all,  the origins of the East-
Asian crises are still harshly debated by economists in the sensitive context of 
globalization. Expectations of further currency crises were plausible after the East-Asian 
and Russian episodes, and Argentina’s meltdown was not exactly a surprise; it followed 
instead the path of a chronicle of a death foretold, and despite warnings, corrective 
measures, international expertise and advise, the inevitable indeed happened. Trying to 
make sense of what went wrong in Argentina, when and why, is thus needed to update 
our understanding of emerging market vulnerability and crisis management. 
 
Many “explanations” or “stories” circulate with respect to this issue. Some may be 
complementary, but have different policy implications. For some, the currency board is to 
be blamed for prolonged overvaluation of the peso, hindering competitiveness of 
Argentina’s exports. For others, the lack of fiscal adjustment and the IMF’s unusually lax 
stance about it, made the debt dynamics unsustainable in the face of prolonged recession. 
Additional stories include a negative external environment, leading to a “sudden stop” of 
capital inflows and ultimately to self-fulfilling expectations about the collapse of the 
currency board system. The paper attempts to revisit these differing stories in trying to 
clarify the various element leading to the crisis. It is organized as follows: the second 
  4section provides a general assessment of the currency board system and discusses the real 
exchange rate overvaluation issue; section III discusses the issue of fiscal adjustment in 
the lead-up to the crisis and during the crisis and presents some debt sustainability 
analysis; section IV discusses the “missing link” in the debt sustainability issue, i.e. the 
growth puzzle in Argentina; section V discusses some important policy recommendations 
pertaining to the effects of global financial integration, such as capital account opening, 
exchange rate policies, alternative to debt financing and the role of the international 
financial institutions.  Section VI offers some final comments. 
 
 
2.  The Currency Board System: Boon or Curse ? 
 
a. Main Achievements and Challenges 
 
The monetary arrangement introduced by President Carlos Menem’s economic team in 
April 1991 was, in the words of HANKE & SCHULER [2002], a “mixture of currency board 
and central banking features”. The Argentine’s peso was linked to the US dollar at a 
fixed rate of 1 to 1, the stock of currency issued was tied to the stock of foreign exchange 
reserves held by the Central Bank, and full convertibility of current and capital account 
transactions was established.  However, the Central Bank retained some latitude for 
discretionary policies, the most obvious being the ability to alter the monetary base by 
transacting in Argentine government debt
2. Beyond the beauty contest associated with the 
“purity” of the currency board arrangement, the parity between the peso and the US 
dollar, which was enshrined in the Constitution, was a major psychological breakthrough 
for a country experiencing chronic hyperinflation episodes. By the same token, the 
Convertibility plan fully recognized the widespread dollarization of the economy as “a 
fact of life” which came as a legacy of the hyperinflation experiences. Both the peso and 
the US dollar circulated as legal tenders, and the dollarization ratio, depicting the ratio of 
foreign currency deposits to broad money, rose to 63% at the end of 2001 from 35% in 
early 1991.  This alone explains the choice of the US dollar as the reference currency, 
although the US is not Argentina’s major trade partner.  An increase in dollarization is 
usually associated with a confidence crisis in the national currency. Yet in Argentina, 
dollarization picked up after a successful price stabilization and reflected mostly portfolio 
shifts from cross-border peso deposits to dollar deposits in the domestic banking system, 
which suggests an increase in confidence in the national economy
3.  
 
The strong monetary anchor provided by the Convertibility plan worked wonders in 
successfully curbing inflation. By 1995, Argentina’s inflation rate was converging 
towards that of the US, after recording annual rates as high as 3000% prior to the 
currency board. US inflation rates were even higher than Argentine rates during the later 
                                                 
2 Some portion of the total reserves of the Central Bank was held in the form of government bonds 
denominated in foreign currency. This feature, coupled with an usually high maximum ratio of foreign 
reserves to monetary liabilities set to 133%, made Argentina’s convertibility system a de facto unorthodox 
currency board.  
3 See BALINO, T., BENNET A, BORENZSTEIN, Monetary Policy in Dollarized Economies, IMF Occasional 
Paper #171, 1999, pp.7-8. 
  5part of the 1990s. This success, coupled with aggressive liberal reforms such as slashing 
trade barriers and a large-scale privatization program, contributed to the restoration of 
investor confidence and placed the country back on the growth track. Between 1991 and 
1995 –during the Convertibility Plan “honeymoon years”- real GDP grew at an average 
annual rate of 8%, and after taking a hit from the Mexican crisis in 1995, the economy 
grew again at an average annual rate of 6% until 1998. But since 1999, the economy fell 
into a severe recession which was never reversed and ultimately led to the financial 
collapse of Argentina at the end of 2001. 
 
Argentine and US interest rates converged relatively rapidly despite some volatility in 
1992 –when there was a speculative attack on the peso- and in 1994-95 following the 
Tequila crisis, but remained remarkably stable during the East-Asian crisis in 1997-98.  
This does not mean that there was no spread left. In fact, domestic lending interest rates 
have tended to remain far above equivalent US dollar rates, owing to a combination of 
high administrative costs stemming from the low monetization of the economy (29% of 
GDP in 2001), inefficiencies of the payment system, credit risk and sizable provisioning 
expenses associated with non-performing loans, and exchange rate risk premium 
reflecting concerns about the viability of the Convertibility plan
4.  
 
One of the additional successes induced by the Convertibility plan and the associated 
credibility was Argentina’s ability to become an important player in international capital 
markets. Thanks to capital account liberalization,  international bonds issues and foreign 
direct investments have been important sources of capital flows into Argentina from 1992 
to 2001, contributing steadily to the financing of the country’s external current account 
deficits
5, together with other borrowing instruments such as bank loans, official and 
multilateral loans and trade credits. Thanks to high domestic interest rates, combined with 
low interest rates in the US and a comprehensive privatization program, Argentina was 
able to rapidly build up reserves from attracting large capital flows. As a result, foreign 
exchange reserves rose continuously until 1999, when they reached about US$ 23 billions 
(see Table 1 below). US$ 96 billion in international bonds were placed on a gross basis 
by Argentina from 1991 through 2001, with the public sector accounting for 75% of the 
total. The amounts picked up especially after 1996, with the average maturity being 5 
years prior to 1996 and 10 years prior to 2001. Interestingly, international bonds 
placements were relatively unaffected by either domestic events or by international 
capital markets turbulence (e.g. East-Asian and Russian crises). These spectacular 
developments contributed to Argentina’s fast economic expansion during the 1990s as 
well as to the building up of a sizable external debt
6, a sign that the “Convertibility Plan’s 
high return on growth depended on external borrowing”  as put by WISE  &  ROETT 
[2000]. 
 
                                                 
4 For an econometric investigation of intermediation spreads in Argentina, see CATAO, L., “Intermediation 
Spreads in a Dual Economy: Argentina in the 1990s”, IMF Working Paper WP/98/90, June 1998. 
5 Between 1992 and 1999, net FDI inflows covered the equivalent of 60% of the current deficit. The 
historical high was reached in 1999, when net FDI covered the equivalent of almost 90% of the deficit. 
6 As shown in Table 1, the debt ratio to GDP doubled from 1993 to 2001, and the accumulation of new debt 
has been impressive during the last 6 years of the Convertibility Plan. 




































































































































































Source: IMF, MECON, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina 
 
 
These impressive financial developments should not hide the fact that Argentina’s 
currency board system came under strain at several occasions during the last decade, 
resulting in substantial capital flow reversals and major turbulence in the banking system 
(see Table 2). The “Tequila crisis” that hit Mexico in 1994 severely affected Argentina, 
as investors started to shy away from emerging markets. Through financial market 
linkages, Argentina experienced a major liquidity crisis. As the banking system lost 17% 
of its total deposits in less than 6 months, the Central Bank lost 35% of its liquid 
international reserves. Prime interest rates soared, creating a severe credit crunch and 
resulting in numerous bank failures. This episode proved extremely costly for the 
Argentine economy, which suffered from a major recession in 1995. As Chart 2 below 
shows, the currency risk (proxied by the spread of peso over US dollar bonds) was 
particularly high at the time of the Tequila crisis, and reached comparable levels only in 
the later part of 2001. The subsequent sharp recovery of the economy was short-lived as 
East-Asia entered into massive financial turmoil in 1997, soon to be followed by the 
Russian default in August 1998. Both crises resulted in a substantial reserve loss, but the 
magnitude of the costs is in no way comparable to the damage inflicted by the Tequila 
crisis. These successive crises have led to very high interest policies in order to prevent 
capital flight, which clearly constrained domestic investment. The last blow came in 
January 1999, when Brazil, Argentina’s major trading partner, devalued the Real. The 
devaluation fostered fears about the induced loss of competitiveness of Argentine exports 
and soured trade relations between the two countries, particularly in the automobile 
sector. But apart from negative spillover effects on the real sector of the economy,  the 
most serious impact of the Brazilian devaluation was to shake for the first time the 
intangibility of the Convertibility Plan, as rumors surfaced about moving towards greater 
exchange rate flexibility. This was immediately taken into account by financial markets, 
as spreads started to increase again. In retrospect, it appears that the economic recession 
in Argentina following the Brazilian devaluation literally pushed the country off track, 
  7and inexorably led to the crisis, as growth failed to resume and capital market confidence 
vanished for good.   
 
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic and Financial Indicators, 1991-2001 
 
  1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Current account balance (US$ bn)  -0.6 -7.8 -4.9 -12.0 -12.3 -4.4
Capital account balance (US$ bn)  -7.3 11.0 2.9 15.6 14.1 -7.5
International reserves (US$ bn)  5.8 11.8 9.8 16.3 22.8 14.8
Equity Investment  2.3 36.3 5.6 6.4 11.2 3.6
   Foreign Direct Investment (US$ bn) 2.4 2.6 3.8 5.5 22.6 3.0
   Portfolio investment (US$ bn)  -0.03 33.7 1.8 0.9 -11.4 0.6
International bonds issues 
   Public sector 



















Total Public debt (US$ bn) 



























Total external debt (% GDP)  35.0 27.7 39.2 44.7 52.6 53.8 
 
Source: IMF, MECON, IIF 
 










Reserves loss (% change)  -35.6 -4.9 -5.4 -10.7
Total deposits (% change)  -20.4 3.3 1.8 2.9
Capital flight (net, US$ bn) *  -9.8 -6.7 -2.7 5.3
Industrial production (% change)  -5.3 7.5 1.2 -5.8
* Represents the degree of under/over funding of the current account deficit. A negative number depicts capital leaving 
the country 
Source: IMF, EIU, WISE & ROETT [2002] 
 
 
Conclusion - From the macroeconomic performance of Argentina during the 1990s, by 
the convergence of both prices and interest rates to international levels,  and by the ability 
of the arrangement to go through the turbulences of all the financial crises which affected 
markets between 1994 and 1999, the Convertibility plan represented a successful 
exchange rate stabilization example. However, the external adjustment mechanism 
inherent in any rigid fixed exchange system in the presence of capital mobility induced 
large output shocks and rising unemployment. As shown in Chart 3,  apart from a timid 
recovery in 1996-97, unemployment has been rising steadily since the launch of the 
Convertibility Plan, reaching 18% of GDP at the start of the crisis. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it would appear that the tradeoff between price stability and growth became 
increasingly questionable after the Mexican Peso crisis. Indeed, the relevance of the 
major premise of the currency board, namely that monetary shocks were predominant in 
Argentina, was challenged in the face of large commodity price swings and the spillover 
effects of financial crises in other emerging market economies. 










































































































b. Currency Overvaluation and Competitiveness Problems: Myth or Reality ? 
 
In all nominal exchange rate stabilization episodes, the uninvited guest is sooner or later 
competitiveness problems associated with a progressive overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate. This, in turn, affects the trade performance of the country. This classic 
problem occurred with all currency board arrangements
7 in the past.  In the case of 
                                                 
7 See GHOSH, A., GULDE, A.R., WOLF, C., “Currency Boards: The Ultimate Fix?”, IMF Working Paper 
WP/98/8, January 1998, pp.12-14. 
  9  10
Argentina, the overvaluation story deserves close scrutiny, not least because some 
authors (HANKE & SCHULER [2002]) have challenged its accuracy. One obvious starting point 
in the analysis is to look at the real effective exchange rate (REER): as shown in Chart 4, 
the (multilateral) real trade weighted exchange rate initially appreciated about 50% from 
1991 to June 1993, reflecting much higher (yet decreasing) inflation rates in Argentina 
than abroad and Balassa-Samuelson effectsTP
8
PT; then, during a second phase ranging from 
July 1993 to July 1996, there was a 13% depreciation of the real exchange rate, mostly 
reflecting the loosening of the US monetary policy and the problems of Brazil’s Real 
Plan; finally, during a last phase starting in August 1996 and ending in December 2001, 
the real exchange rate appreciated by 15%, reflecting the sizable appreciation of the US 
dollar against major other currencies (including the EURO after the year 2000) as well as 
Brazil’s devaluation in January 1999TP
9
PT. The sizable effect of the Real devaluation on the 
bilateral REER with Brazil is also shown in Chart 5, together with gradual depreciation 
of the bilateral REER with the United States during the same period.  
 




















































































































































USourceU: Authors’ Calculations 








Therefore, a rise in the index represents an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, i.e. a rise in the 
price of non-tradables relative to the price of tradables. 
 
 
                                                 
TP
8
PT The Balassa-Samuelson effect describes the role of differential productivity growth rates in the tradable 
and the non-tradable sectors in real appreciation of the real exchange rate. This typically happens in 
countries undergoing price stabilization and trade opening. 
TP
9
PT See ESCUDE,  G.,  GABRIELLI,  M.,  SABBAN, V., Evolución del Tipo de Cambio Real Multilateral de 
Argentina en los últimos 10 años, Nota Técnica #11, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Octubre del 
2001. It is important, however, to distinguish the share of the real appreciation that is justified 
by changes in fundamentals from the share signaling a competitiveness problem, and 
hence, a real overvaluation problem. Typically, competitiveness issues are likely to arise 
when real appreciation is associated with a serious loss of growth and high external 
imbalances. As shown in Table 3 below, Argentina experienced a sharp deterioration in 
its foreign trade balance as economic growth picked up, and the trade balance exhibited a 
countercyclical behavior, being negative during the high growth year and becoming 
slightly positive during the recession years. By contrast, current account deficit figures 
suggest an increasingly serious situation after 1996, crossing the sustainability general 
rule-of–thumb of 4-5%, especially because the economy entered into recession.  
 
Table 3. External balance and Real Growth, 1991-2001 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 
Export volume (% change)  -2.2  -1.5  7  17.4  25.1 6.6  15  11.6  -0.7 2.8  4.5 
Export price (% change)  -0.7 3.6 0.2 2.9 5.7 6.5  -3.5  -10.4  -11.2  10.3  -3.5 
Export value (% change)  -3.1 2.2 7.2  20.7  32.4  13.6 11.0  0.0  -11.8 13.3  0.9 
Import volume (% change)  111.7 83.5 15.5 28.9  -13 19.8 31.1 8.7  -13.9 0.7 -17.0 
Import price (% change)  -3.9 -2.1 -2.2  1.4  5.4 -1.2 -2.3 -5.1 -5.6  1.2  -2.9 
Import value (% value)  102.0 79.7 12.9 28.6  -6.8 18.1 28.1 3.1  -18.8 1.9 -19.0 
Trade balance (% GDP)  1.9 -0.6 -1.0 -1.5  0.8  0.6 -0.7 -1.0 -0.3  0.9  2.8 
Current account balance (%GDP)  -0.4 -2.4 -3.0 -4.3 -2.0 -2.4 -4.2 -4.9 -4.2 -3.1  -1.6 




In fact, the trade deficit of the 1990s reflected the much lower growth in export volumes 
relative to import volumes, although the high volatility of both exports and imports must 
be noted. Four factors account for this trend:  
 
-First, Argentine exports were in fact extremely sensitive to world commodity prices; as 
commodity prices fell after 1996, exports stalled after 1998 and never managed to 
recover their earlier dynamism (the terms of trade correlation with exports prices is 
shown in Chart 5 below).  
 
-Second, exports proved to be highly elastic not only to net aggregate investment but to  
domestic consumption as well. The role of domestic demand is also evident on the import 
side, as evidenced by the pro-cyclical behavior of imports. This suggests inter alia that a 
sizable share of the export capacity generated by gross capital formation was systemically 
crowded out by domestic consumption, while imports were sensitive to the domestic 




-Third, manufacturing exports have been highly sensitive to the level of economic 
activity in MERCOSUR countries, as well as to relative price trends with those countries. 
In particular, growth in Brazil has been a key determinant for Argentine exports, as 
                                                 
10See CATAO,  L.,  FALCETTI,  E., “Determinants of Argentina’s External Trade”, IMF Working Paper 
WP/99/21, September 1999, p.31. 
  11evidenced by Chart 6. This comes from the system of government incentives and bilateral 
agreements which lowered tariff rates for key industries (e.g. automobiles) and tied 
export of these products to partner country’s imports of a similar good, with a view to 
keeping bilateral trade roughly in balance
11.  
 
-Fourth, Argentine exports have been shown to be responsive to unit labor costs, which 
measure the relative price of exports. This is hardly surprising since in a fixed exchange 
rate setting, the only way to increase the profitability of tradables is to lower the price of 
non-tradables, which requires downwards nominal price and wage adjustment. 
Unfortunately, as shown in Chart 7, the relative price of tradables, measured by the ratio 
of consumer prices (CPI) to producer prices (PPI), has followed an erratic course and 
ended up at the same level in December 2001 as in 1994. When the relative price of 
tradables is based on the various components of the CPI and of the Wholesale Price 
Index, the picture is even more dramatic, showing a steady decline from 1994 to 2001. 
The common message of these various measures is not fundamentally different, however, 
and confirms that non-tradable prices failed to decline over time. For the most part, this 
reflects significant labor market rigidities prevailing in Argentina such as strong union 
power and collective wage bargaining, rigid labor regulations including high social 
contribution from employers and unrealistically heavy severance payments
12. Thus, labor 
costs were notoriously high and were an important element behind the so-called 
“Argentine extra cost”
13. A similar picture emerges when looking at productivity 
estimates. Following the structural measures introduced with the Convertibility plan, 
labor productivity increased steadily and grew 4.5% from 1991 and 1995, with the most 
spectacular changes intervening in the energy, utilities and financial services sectors. Yet, 
productivity growth was virtually nil between 1996 and 2000, averaging 0.4%
14, an issue 
that will be explored further in section IV. 
 
Finally, the mirror effect of the continuing external imbalances in Argentina was the 
dramatic decline in the net foreign asset position, as shown in Chart 8. All these elements 
(i.e. growing external imbalances, lack of relative price adjustment, absence of 
productivity growth) tend to suggest that the overvaluation of the peso became an issue 
only between mid 1996 and 2001, i.e. during the third period of the real exchange rate 





                                                 
11 CATAO & FALCETTI, op.cit. p.7. Note that YEASTS [1997] went further in outlining the trade-diversion 
aspect of the MERCOSUR framework, especially in capital-intensive sectors, but other studies 
(NAGARAJAN[1998]) point to less clear-cut results. 
12 In 1999, taxes on labor as a proportion of total payroll payments were above 40% and were higher than 
the average of both industrialized and Latin American economies. 
13 Argentina: the labor market, Deloitte & Touche, October 2000. 
14 The McKinsey Quaterly, #2, 2002. For TFP calculations, see also LANTERI, L. “Fuentes de crecimiento 
en la Argentina y en los países recientemente industrializados del este del Asia. ¿ Podría pensarse en un 
milagro del crecimiento económico Argentino?”, Documento de Trabajo #6, Banco Central del la 
Republica Argentina, 1999. 
  12Chart 5. Export Prices & Terms of Trade           Chart 6. Exports from Argentina to Brazil 













































































































Exports to Brazil ( % Change, LHS scale)
Real GDP Growth in Brazil (% RHS scale)
 
Source: IMF, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, MECHÓN 





















































































































































































































Source: Author’s Calculations based on INDEC, MECON, IFS statistics and Chart 4. 
Note:  The CPI-based relative price is defined as the ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods and 
services listed in the CPI index
15.  
The wholesale-based relative price is the ratio of imported to domestic wholesale prices. 
Net foreign assets are proxied by (cumulative) current accounts positions. 
 
Although the above evidence supports convincingly the overvaluation story, HANKE & 
SCHULER [2002] have actually argued that the Peso was slightly undervalued in 2001 against the 
US Dollar, using the notorious Big Mac Index published by The Economist (Chart 9). 
Accordingly, the Peso seemed to be overvalued in the first years of the currency board 
                                                 
15 Non-Tradables are assumed to include Housing and Related Services, Transport & Communications, and 
Education. These three categories are worth 34% of the CPI index. Tradables are assumed to include Food 
& Drinks, Clothing, Housing Equipment & Furniture, Medical Services & Supplies,  Leisure Goods & 
Services and Miscellaneous services.. 
  13arrangement, but not during the last five years. This interpretation is extremely debatable, 
however, due to the inherent limitations of this index, which builds on the purchasing 
power parity theory (PPP). As it is well known, absolute PPP is supposed to hold in the 
long run only, and rests on restrictive assumptions. Furthermore, departures from PPP in 
the short run are common, owing to a various factors including the existence of barriers 
to trade (tariffs, taxes and transportation costs), the inclusion of non-traded elements in 
the price index used, and pricing to market. In the specific case of Argentina, it is 
intuitive to think that the decisive element of the puzzle is the existence of non-traded 
elements in the cost of a “Big Mac”, and in particular the unusually low cost of labor in 
the hotel and restaurant sector, owing to the widespread use of undeclared workers.  As 
shown by PAKKO & POLLARD [2003], differences in “Big Mac” prices across countries 
ultimately reflect differences in net hourly wages, thereby suggesting that deviations from 
PPP are driven by the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Further evidence of deviations from 
PPP can also be detected in estimating a model of equilibrium exchange rate. On the 
basis of a simple two goods/two countries model, where the real equilibrium exchange 
rate clears both internal and external balances, Annex II presents some results suggesting 
a long term relationship between the real exchange rate, relative prices, real commodity 
prices, net foreign assets and the fiscal balance. Decomposing this relation between 
permanent and transitory components, the results tend to show that the final decoupling 
of the real exchange rate compared to its “equilibrium value” took place between 1999 
and 2001 (Chart 10). The overvaluation implied by the gap between the actual and the 
equilibrium exchange rate was of 20% at the end of 2001. This line of analysis of also 
consistent with the works of ALBEROLA et alt. [2003], who carry out a similar exercise 
over a longer time period with a slightly different model, and who find an even larger 
overvaluation at the end of 2001
16. 
Chart 9. Under(-)/Over(+) 
Valuation against the US Dollar 












































































































































                     Source: The Economist      Source: Author’s calculations  
Note: the Equilibrium REER depicted in 
Chart 10 is a polynomial trend line of the 
model-based Equilibrium REER estimated 
in Annex II. 
                                                 
16 See Annex II for a discussion of the results and of the differences between the two approaches.  
  14Thus, there is little doubt that a real exchange rate misalignment developed during the 
last five years of the Convertibility plan, and that this contributed to Argentina’s 
competitiveness problems. However, it is worth pointing out that the root of Argentina’s 
competitiveness problems was not only the overvalued currency. A country’s 
comparative advantage depends not only on price and cost competitiveness, but also 
nonprice competitiveness, such as technological innovation, investment in physical and 
human capital, and service-related factors. In this respect, the picture was not in favor of 
Argentina, as the country’s generally good education system –even if is skewed towards 
higher education- was counterbalanced by very weak technological innovation 
performances, low investment in research & development, quality problems and lack of a 
proper judiciary system
17.  In addition, as most Argentine firms continued to rely on local 
banks for their financing, relatively high lending costs (ranging from 12% for large 
companies to 20-30% for SMEs) had a detrimental effect on industry competitiveness 
and employment. As a result, very few sectors were truly competitive by international 




Accepting that there was an exchange rate misalignment developed towards the later 
stage of the Convertibility plan does not automatically imply that current account 
imbalances between 1996 and 2001 were large enough to cause a financial crisis
19.  By 
any standard, Argentina’s current account developments alone could not have triggered 
adverse capital markets sentiments. Yet, focusing on the current account and trade 
deficits ratios to GDP does not capture the whole story. What is peculiar about 
Argentina’s trade performance is that despite aggressive trade reforms undertaken at the 
beginning of the 1990s, Argentina remained a relatively closed economy. As shown in 
Table 4, the openness ratio of Argentina is around 20% of GDP, and exports contribute to 
a mere 10% of GDP, which sharply contrasts with the much higher ratios of other 
emerging economies with the notable exception of Brazil.
20.  
 
The implication is straightforward in the context external of debt sustainability: with a 
limited export performance and heavy borrowing, the debt-to-export ratio is likely to rise 
very rapidly to very high levels, forcing the country to start rolling over its debt, and 
making the economy extremely vulnerable to foreign shocks. A quick examination of 
debt figures confirms this analysis. Although the debt-to-GDP ratio ended up at around 
55% of GDP in 2001 –which is not very high by international standards-, it almost 
doubled since 1994, and the total external debt stands at more than 400% of exports. But 




                                                 
17 According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002  produced by the World Economic Forum 
and the Harvard Center for Economic Development,  Argentina’s notable competitive disadvantages 
include low innovation, weak technology transfers, as well as institutional and governance impediments. 
18 Argentina Trade Performance Index 1996-2000, International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO. 
19 See POWELL [2002] for a numerical discussion of this issue. 
20 Brazil’s openness ratio is low as well, but this is at least partially explained by the fact that it is a 
relatively large economy (see Table 4). 
  15Table 4. Trade Openness in Selected Countries 
(%) 
 
  1992 1995 1998 2000 
Argentina 
  Trade/GDP 









































































Thailand   
 Trade/GDP 

















As Chart 11 shows, the debt-service-to-export ratio dramatically increased after 1996 and 
reached 85% of exports in 2001. Another illustration of the problem is given by the debt-
service-to-internal-revenue ratio, which followed a similar trend, reaching 55% in 2001. 
Such ratios are exceptionally high compared to those of other emerging economies with 
the striking exception of Brazil. Interestingly, in the case of Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPCs) launched by the IMF and the World Bank 1996, a sustainable debt-
service ratio was believed to be close to 25% of exports and a sustainable ratio of total 
external debt to exports was set anything below 250%; additionally, a ratio of 20% of 
government revenues was used a frequent benchmark. Argentina was not playing in the 
same league as HIPC countries, but it is obvious that its borrowing strategy relied 
excessively on the low currency risk associated with the credibility of the Convertibility 
Plan. The fact that debt-to-GDP increased by 10 percentage points between 1996 and 
1998 when real GDP was growing by 6% on average certainly signaled the beginning of 
an unsustainable path because the situation could only worsen with the slowing down of 
the economy
21. Furthermore, 68% of the debt was denominated in US dollar, and 20% on 
EURO whereas only 5% was in Argentine Peso (Chart 12). Thus, Argentina faced the 
dual challenge of persuading creditors that it could both generate enough revenues to 
service its debt and convert these revenues into foreign exchange with an exchange rate 
that was rigidly pegged to the dollar
22. This does not mean that Argentina’s debt was 
grossly mishandled. On the contrary, debt managers were careful to avoid relying on 
short-term debt or on floating interest rate instruments, and smartly exploited market 
opportunities to float new amounts of sovereign debt in global credit markets until the 
                                                 
21 During that period, the average annual bond issue more than doubled in size, despite the international 
turbulence associated with the East-Asian meltdown and the Russian default. 
22 MUSSA [2002], p.9. 
  16second quarter of 2001. Argentina was also able to swap US$ 30 billion of sovereign debt 
(20% of total) for larger maturities in the spring of 2001, thereby decreasing the amount 
of debt service (interest and principal) due between 2001 and 2005.  The tradeoff was that 
the terms of the debt swap substantially increased debt service in later years. The move 
was consistent with what was perceived at the time as a liquidity problem, and not a 
solvency issue. However, even with appropriate management, one cannot postpone the 
problem indefinitely and keep convincing international capital markets that the 
Argentine’s economy would grow again and move away from dangerous illiquidity.   
 









































































Source: World Bank, MECON 
 
 
When did the final confidence crisis happen ? Relying excessively on low currency risk 
makes the currency board arrangement the last bastion of credibility. Once cracks appear 
in the structure of the arrangement, devaluation expectations build and the crisis is self-
fulfilling in nature. In Argentina, those cracks were clearly visible in the early Summer of 
2001, when Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo tinkered with the rules of the currency 
board by pegging the peso to a currency basket including the Euro and introducing a dual 
exchange rate system, thereby de facto devaluing the peso by 8% for trade transactions. 
Gambling with the credibility of the already fragile currency board system convinced 
markets that the Convertibility Plan was doomed. The departure of the Central Bank 
Governor, who was notoriously at odds with Domingo Cavallo, added to the pressure. 
Spreads soared soon after, reaching 2000 basis points on August 1
st, 2001. A very last 
IMF package disbursed in September 2001 did little but postpone the inevitable: by the 
end of November 2001, reserves were barely sufficient to cover money in circulation and 
the run on banks achieved  unprecedented levels.   
 
Conclusion - Judging by the classic requirements of an optimal currency area, Argentina 
was not an obvious case of permanent exchange rate fixing, and the US Dollar was 
  17certainly not an obvious choice for pegging the exchange rate in the long run, as 
Argentina’s trade is primarily directed towards MERCOSUR and Europe. As suggested 
above, there is little doubt that a real exchange rate misalignment developed during the 
last five years of the Convertibility plan, and this certainly contributed to Argentina’s 
competitiveness problems. Worse, by relying so much on foreign financing and thus on 
debt,  Argentina trapped itself on a classical policy dilemma: either stabilize output or  
achieve external balance. As put elegantly by HAUSMANN & VELASCO [2002], it is clear 
that Argentina had an exchange rate problem, but it is not obvious that it had an exchange 
rate solution, especially with an external debt almost entirely denominated in foreign 
currency.  Argentina’s credibility was inexorably tied to its currency board so that it 
became virtually impossible to touch the arrangement. Indeed, having an exit strategy for 
a policy which is not revocable raises some internal consistency issues ! As a result, the 
government was completely glued to the convertibility dogma, and even today, no 
Argentine politician is willing to claim responsibility for revoking the currency board 
arrangement. With the benefit of hindsight, it is certainly possible to argue that Argentina 
should have devalued much earlier, say in 1998-1999, but it is less clear that the 
necessary structural reforms aimed at making the devaluation work and jumpstarting the 
economy would have been politically feasible. And given the high dependence of 
Argentina on capital flows, redefining the terms of market confidence would have been a 
tough gamble. Let us not forget that after the East-Asian crisis and the Russian meltdown, 
investors became extremely risk adverse. 
 
 
3.  Fiscal Adjustment: Too Little or Too Much ? 
 
Blaming Argentina’s bad fiscal performance from 1991 to 2001 has become the dominant 
ex-post story, endorsed by the IFIs (KRUEGER [2002], PERRY & SÉRVEN [2002]), the 
financial community and various authors (e.g. BAER, ELOSEGUI & GALLO [2002], MUSSA 
[2002] and WYPLOSZ [2002a]). For example,  MUSSA [2002] described Argentina in a 
colorful style as being a “chronic alcoholic” in the management of its fiscal affairs (“once 
its starts to imbibe the political pleasures of deficit spending, it keeps on going until it 
reaches the economic equivalent of falling down drunk” p, 7). According to these authors, 
Argentina suffered from a lack of fiscal adjustment –for which the IMF is to blame for 
being unusually lax- which ultimately triggered the financial crisis because of debt 
dynamics. However, this interpretation of the Argentine crisis has several detractors, 
including HAUSSMANN & VELASCO [2002] and STIGLITZ [2002], who argue that fiscal 
imbalances were not so large and were very much related to the economic recession. 
According to that interpretation, fiscal tightening could only make things worse in 
slowing growth even further, and this could have precipitated the crisis rather than halted 
it.  
 
This passionate debate about the role of fiscal policy is hardly surprising. As in any fixed 
exchange-rate system, the Convertibility Plan greatly reduced the choice of policies 
available to policy makers to mitigate shocks. Monetary policy being (almost) 
unavailable by design, adjustment rests on the shoulders of fiscal policy alone, making it  
virtually the only tool of macroeconomic management. This implies the need to strike a 
  18difficult balance between (short term) flexibility and (long-term) rules to maintain a 
sustainable debt level.  
 
So what is the evidence in the case of Argentina, and why is there such a divergence of 
views about the role of fiscal policy in the crisis ? 
 
 
a. Fiscal Performance –Let the Numbers Talk 
 
With a record of eight stabilization programs fully or partially implemented in the 25 
years preceding the Convertibility Plan (three of which took place between 1985 and 
1990!), Argentina has had first-hand experience of the disastrous effects of deficit 
financing through direct monetization. In fact, low growth, inflation and chronic deficits 
plagued the economy, with budget deficits averaging 6-8% of GDP for most of the 1980s. 
Putting a halt to this vicious circle was precisely the rationale behind the convertibility 
system, by making recourse to easy money constitutionally impossible. Against this 
background, Table 5 below gives a snapshot of the consolidated fiscal accounts of 
Argentina in the 1990s and Table 6 presents some estimates of the fiscal stance and 
impulse
23. Five immediate observations can be made by taking a close look at the 
numbers. 
  
First, when off-budget operations are taken into account, fiscal accounts were 
continuously in deficit during the whole time of the Convertibility plan, including during 
the high growth years. If the social security system –which was privatized in 1993- is 
excluded from the calculations, the picture is almost the same, although the deficit figures 
are more modest. The fiscal stance measures essentially confirm this observation: the 
fiscal stance was expansionary throughout the whole period 1992-2001, although it 
turned slightly contractionary  after 1999, when the social security system is excluded 
from the calculations. 
 
Second, the primary balance was even moderately positive until the Tequila crisis, but did 
not exhibit a worsening trend before 2001. Interestingly, some fiscal adjustment took 
place during the second half of the period (except in 1999), as the primary balance did 
not collapse despite the recession. The primary balance was comparatively weak during 
the boom years, i.e. when the economy was growing at 8% on average. This story is 
confirmed by fiscal impulse measures (see Chart 13), which show that fiscal policy had a 
pro-cyclical effect on aggregate demand during the boom years (1992-1994) and then 
turned slightly negative, as fiscal adjustment was attempted. 
 
                                                 
23 The stance of fiscal policy is defined here as the difference between the actual fiscal balance and an 
estimate of the cyclically adjusted balance, calculated using revenue and expenditure rations in a base year 
in which actual and potential output were deemed to be the same. The underlying idea is that cyclical 
factors in the budget balance are transitory and self-correcting whereas an analysis of the fiscal impact 
should focus essentially on underlying “discretionary” policy actions that are expected to have a lasting 
impact on demand. The fiscal impulse simple represents the change in the fiscal stance from one year to 
another. 
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Third, (non-interest) public expenditures were relatively flat during the whole period, and 
did not exhibit a particular spending feast. Yet, there was a marked deterioration in 1999, 
due to a sharp increase in the wage bill. On the revenue side, it is fairly clear that tax 
performance has never really taken off, and has remained substantially below that of 
other emerging economies. Tax buoyancy, which measures the increase in the revenue 
collected compared to the relative increase in GDP, was indeed very weak before the 
Tequila crisis (value of 0.9, implying that when GDP grew by 1%, tax revenue grew by 
0.9%) and then gained momentum between 1996 and 1998 (value of 1.9), but fell again 




Fourth, interest payment increased steadily after 1995 and contributed to a significant 
part of the growing deficit. The shift is particularly obvious after the Russian crisis in 
1998. By the same token, debt creating operations –recorded off-budget- have put 
additional weight on the deficit between 1995 and 1999, signaling an increasing reliance 
on debt financing, primarily in the form of bonds. 
 
Fifth, as the financing of the social security system changed after 1993, the social security 
balance shifted from a surplus to a continuous deficit. The cumulated social security 
deficit reached 13.2% GDP between 1996 and 2001, therefore contributing to the bulk of 
the overall deficit. 
 
These numbers show that the fiscal situation was an obvious source of concern 
throughout the period: although deficits were certainly not large by any standard until the 
late 1990s, persistent deficits were not compatible with the implicit rules of the currency 
board system. Fiscal discipline was weak during the high growth years, making it 
difficult for Argentina to reverse the tide during bad economic years. As shown by the 
fiscal impulse measures,  the primary balance excluding the social security system did 
improve between 1996 and 2001 despite an economic recession, revealing some 
adjustment attempts. Such attempts were unfortunately offset by new borrowing and the 
sharp deterioration in the fiscal accounts of 1999, an important presidential election year 
in Argentina. This deterioration, which resulted in non-compliance with the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law enacted in mid-1999, was due to a rise in interest payment as well as 
to an almost 1% GDP increase in the wage bill, and occurred despite the large receipts 
from privatization receipts. Interestingly, the wage bill surge seems to be due both to the 
mounting differential between the wages and salaries paid by the federal government and 
those in the private sector, a well as to a sharp rise in public employment at the regional 
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, is a rough measure as the 
increase in revenue reflects any effects of changes in the tax system, including discretionary changes in the 
tax structure. Table 5. Consolidated Government Operations 
(% GDP) 
 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total  expenditure  23.9 23.8 24.5 25.7 25.6 25.4 25.2 25.8 27.7 28.2 29.8 
Wages  8.0 8.4 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.3 8.2 8.3 9.4 9.5 9.9 
Pensions 5.4  6.0  5.6 5.9 6.0 6.2 5.9 5.8 6.2 6.1 6.2 
Other  7.1 7.5 8.8 9.3 8.7 8.8 8.8 9.0 9.5 8.6 8.9 
Interest  payments  3.0 1.9 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.6 3.4 4.0 4.8 
Total primary spending  20.6  21.9  23.1 24.1 23.7 23.3 22.9 23.2 25.1 24.2 25.0 
Total  Revenue  20.1 23.4 24.6 24.1 23.2 22.2 23.2 23.7 24.3 24.7 23.5 
Tax  13.6 16.2 16.1 16.2 15.2 15.8 16.8 17.4 17.5 18.1 17.5 
Social  security  4.6 5.1 5.9 5.7 5.3 4.4 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.6 
Privatization 0.0  0.9 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 
Other  1.8 1.2 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.8 2.5 
Primary  Balance  1  -0.5  1.4 1.5 0.1 -0.4 -1.1 0.3  0.5  -0.8 0.4  -1.5 
Primary Balance 2 
(exl. social security) 
0.2 2.3 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.4 1.3 1.6 2.8 1.1 
Off-budget  operations  0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 
Overall Balance  
(including interest) 
-3.5 -0.5 -0.3 -1.9 -3.1 -3.6 -2.4 -2.5 -4.7 -3.6 -6.4 
Memorandum: 




















































Real GDP gowth (left scale)
Fiscal Impulse (right scale)
Fiscal Impulse (without social security)
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Table 6. Fiscal Stance and Impulse, 1992-2001 
(% GDP unless specified otherwise) 
 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Primary Surplus  1.4 1.5 0.1  -0.4  -1.1 0.3 0.5  -0.8 0.4  -1.5 
Primary Surplus 
(excl. Social Security, “ESS”) 
2.3 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.4 1.3 1.6 2.8  1.1 
Fiscal Stance  0.0 0.7 2.9 2.6 3.6 2.9 2.5 2.0 0.3  0.2 
Fiscal Stance ESC  0.0 1.7 3.3 2.7 2.4 1.7 1.2 0.6  -1.0  -0.7 
Fiscal Impulse  2.4 0.7 2.3  -0.3 1.1  -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -1.7  -0.1 
Expend. Contribution  5.0  1.9 1.9  -1.2 0.0 0.5 0.1  -0.1  -1.3  -1.3 
Revenue  contribution -2.6 -1.2  0.4  0.9  1.1 -0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3  1.2 
Fiscal Impulse ESC  1.2 1.7 1.7  -0.6  -0.2  -0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -1.6  0.4 
Expend. Contribution  ESS 3.4 2.1 1.4  -1.1  -0.3 0.6 0.3 0.1  -1.1  -0.9 
Revenue contribution ESS  -2.2  -0.4  0.3  0.5  0.1 -1.2 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5  1.3 
Memorandum item 





















USourceU: Author’s calculations  
UNotesU: 
() ( ) ( ) t t Pt t Pt t t Y t T Y g G t Y g PB FS 0 0 0 0   Stance   Fiscal − − − = − − =  
() ( ) 4 43 4 42 1 4 43 4 42 1
on contributi   e Expenditur
0
on contributi   Revenue
0 Impulse   Fiscal Pt t t t t Y g G T Y t FS ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ − + − = =  
Where PBBt
B is the primary balance in year t, GBt
B and TBt 
Bare the nominal primary expenditure and revenue in 
period t, gB0
B and tB0
B are the ratios of expenditure and revenue relative to GDP in the equilibrium base year, YBt
B 
and YBpt 
B the actual and potential GDP in year t. 
 
Base year: following IMF research on Argentina, 1992 was selected as the base year (see IMF Country 
Report  98/38, p.7) 
 
Potential output: two estimates were constructed, one through the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, and one 
fitting a straight line. In order to control for the bias produced by the HP filter at end-points, a median value 
between the two estimates was calculated. 
 
 
b. The Tax System – Collection, Exemptions, Federalism and Other Evils 
 
As indicated in the previous section, one of the striking features of Argentina’s fiscal 
record during the last decade was the relatively weak tax revenue performance. Reform 
of the tax regime was introduced together with the convertibility plan, but despite various 
tax hikes, including the controversial “impuestazo”  implemented in 2000, revenue 
collection remained far behind expectations. This problem was crucial from a policy 
standpoint because public expenditures were by and large inflexibleTP
25
PT.  Indeed, the 
average tax pressure (i.e. the ratio of domestic revenue to GDP) of the central 
government was 13.1% of GDP between 1995 and 2000, while the consolidated 
government figure was 16.9%. For comparison purposes, the corresponding figures were 
respectively 16.4% and 22.1% in Chile, 16.3% and 19.3% in Uruguay, and 17.7% and 
26.1% in Brazil during the same period. Among the factors contributing to poor tax 
revenue performance in Argentina, the most notorious is high  tax evasion, which is 
                                                 
TP
25
PT According to data published by MECON, earmarked public expenditures accounted for 85% of total 
expenditures on average between 1993 and 2001. fueled by high tax rates, a tradition of tax amnesties, and pervasive incentives linked to 
its federal system.  
 
Tax Regime – The Laffer Curve Strikes Back.   
Tax evasion is usually estimated at around 30-40% in Argentina, with the highest evasion 
recorded on VAT (45%)
26. Industry-specific estimates indicate that this phenomenon 
reaches surrealistic levels in the hotel and restaurant sector (for every $100 paid, $160 is 
evaded), followed by the shoe and textile industry, retailing and food processing
27. This 
simply reflects the fact that the bulk of those sectors operates in the underground 
economy. In the more formal sectors, tax evasion is in the 40% range. This is by no 
means an exception in Latin America, where tax evasion is widespread and has reached 
the status of a national sport. Comparative data is scarce, but anecdotal evidence suggest 
that Argentina’s tax evasion figures easily compare to those of Brazil, Mexico or 




Apart from a genuine “culture” of tax evasion –especially among the elite-, one factor 
that has definitely aggravated the problem is the heavy tax burden. Even by Latin 
American standards, corporate tax were very high at 35% (compared to 15% in Chile), 
and VAT ranged from 21% (general rate) to 27% (services such as electricity, gas and 
water). Furthermore, labor taxes were higher than the average for both industrialized and 
Latin American countries, and accounted for more than 40% of total payroll payment. As 
a result, combined payroll taxes have averaged 43%. At the provincial level, the major 
tax used was the turnover tax, which is a cascading tax that constitutes a drag on 
enterprise’s cost, fosters inefficient vertical integration, increases exports costs, and de 
facto competes with the federal value added tax
29. The heavy tax regime of Argentina 
yielded a well-known Laffer curve effect, as tax evasion was used by companies (SMEs in 
particular) to cut costs with a growing number of people forced to join the informal 
economy. 
 
In the hope to encourage tax filing and boost tax collection, various forms of tax 
amnesties (backward-looking “moratorias”, spontaneous filing and other open-ended 
facilities) were granted virtually every year between 1991 and 2000, both at the Federal 
and at the Provincial level,  Overall, such attempts have produced few tangible results, as 
less than 40% of the overdue consolidated tax was actually paid at the Federal level
30. 
The authorities have also tried to use high-tech means to help fight tax evasion by 
implementing a wheat crop satellite monitoring service in 2001, but tax evasion is similar 
to currency substitution in that repressive means usually achieve the opposite results.  
 
                                                 
26 T OMMASI,  M.,  SAIEGH,  S.,  SANGUINETTI,  P., “Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics and 
Institutional Reform:, Economia, Spring 2001, p.161. 
27 ELSTRODT, H.P., et al., “Micro Lessons for Argentina”, The MacKinsey Quarterly, No.2, 2002. 
28  BARRO,  P.,  JORRATT, M., “Estimación de la evasión tributario  en Chile”, Mimeo, Servicio de 
Impuestos Internos (Chile), Junio 1999, p.18. 
29 TOMMASI, SAIEGH, SANGUINETTI, op.cit., p.163. 
30 See Section V on Federal Tax Amnesties in IMF SM/00/203, “Argentina – Selected Issues and Statistical 
Appendix”, September 2000, pp.26-30. 
  23Tax Structure – The Uninvited Guests of Fiscal Federalism 
Argentina is organized as a Federation, with a great deal of fiscal responsibility accruing 
to the Provinces. Fiscal decentralization is far-reaching by Latin-American standards, 
especially on the expenditure side since Provinces are responsible for more than two-
thirds of public sector expenditures (excluding pensions)
31. On the tax side, despite 
constitutional responsibilities accruing to the Provinces, the task of administering most of 
the important taxes (including VAT and income taxes) has been delegated to the national 
government. This system of expenditure decentralization cum tax centralization has 
resulted in a high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, as more than one third of the 
Provinces finance less than 20% of their expenditure with their own revenue. Argentina 
addresses this large vertical fiscal imbalance through a complex system of 
intergovernmental transfers.  The most important component of this system is the tax-
sharing agreement (“Coparticipación”), which is the process by which part of the taxes 
collected by the central government are reallocated to the provinces.  This, coupled with 
the large borrowing authority allocated to Provinces, “has been shown to create negative 
incentives for provincial administration by inducting a common pool problem and by 
causing provincial authorities to behave opportunistically”
32. For instance, many 
provincial governments used generous industrial promotion regimes, which exempted 
industries established in certain regions from national taxes (VAT in particular). Such 
regimes have generated substantial tax competition among the different regions and 
created an important revenue shortfall for the Central Government. 
 
Under such conditions, it does not come as a surprise that provincial governments ran 
continuous deficits between 1991 and 2001, which on average were larger than those of 
the central government. In several cases, the Central government had to bail out 
provinces in financial difficulties, especially during the first half of the 1990s. This 
accumulation of deficits translated into increasing debt financing, the stock of which 
reached 80% of  central government revenue in 2001, as shown in Table 7. Interestingly, 
a significant part of this additional financing was forced on suppliers and public 
employees, as some provinces accumulated large amounts of wage arrears. Indeed, on 
average, such arrears accounted for 20% of aggregate provincial debt, whereas bank 
loans totaled 30%, public bonds 10%, international organizations 20% and other means 
(including debt with the national government) 20%.  Furthermore, some portion of the 
wages and debt to suppliers was paid with provincial bonds. This practice started in 1995 
in the Córdoba region and accelerated until the meltdown of the Currency Plan. These 
bonds were used for transactions purposes in their respective provinces, and some of 
them could even been withdrawn from ATM cash machines, thereby constituting quasi-
currencies. In 2001, the Central government even agreed that these bonds be used in the 
payment of national taxes. By December 2001, more than 20 quasi-currencies were 
identified - the most important of which are summarized in Table 8- amounting to US$ 4 
bn, i.e. 22% of the peso-denominated money supply.  
 
                                                 
31 T OMMASI,  M.,  SAIEGH,  S.,  SANGUINETTI,  P., “Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics and 
Institutional Reform”, Economia, Spring 2001, p.150.  
32 TOMMASI, SAIEGH & SANGUINETTI [2001], op.cit., p.154. 
  24Table 7. Aggregate Provincial Debt, 1994-2001 
 
  US$ bn  % change  As % GDP  As % Total Central Govt. 
Revenue 
1994  11.1 …  4.3% 35.1% 
1995  14.6 31.5%  5.7% 47.0% 
1996  15.6 6.8%  5.7% 47.0% 
1997  14.8 -5.1%  5.1% 38.6% 
1998  15.8 6.8%  5.3% 39.1% 
1999  16.8 6.3%  5.9% 43.5% 
2000  21.3 26.8%  7.5% 52.4% 




Table 8. Quasi-Currencies in Circulation, December 2001 
 
Issuer Denomination  US$  bn 
Federal Government  “LECOP”  1.9 
Provincial Governments    2.1 
   Buenos Aires  “Patacones” (A and B)  0.9 
   Catamarca  “Ley 4748”  0.03 
   Córdoba  “LECOR”  0.5 
   Corrientes  “Cecacor”  0.2 
   Chaco  “Quebracho”  0.05 
   Entre Rios  “Federal”  0.2 
 “Bonfe”  0.05 
   Formosa  “Bocanfor”  0.05 
   Jujuy  “Patacon”  0 
   La Rioja  “Bocade”  0 
   Mendoza  “Petrom”  0 
   Tucumán  “Bocade”  0.09 
    
Total Quasi-Currencies    4.0 
As % of pesos in circulation (M0)    37% 
As % of M3 (peso)    22% 
Source: TOMMASI [2002], MECON 
 
In a nutshell, this section has illustrated some of the constraints which plagued fiscal 
performance in Argentina, particularly on the tax revenue side. Although the details lie 
outside the scope of this paper, it appears that fiscal federalism gave rise to typical free 
rider and moral hazard problems, leading to rising and uncontrolled debt financing at the 
level of the regions while tax erosion and evasion was fueled by an improper tax regime, 
which was not conducive to private sector growth. 
 
 
c. Debt Sustainability Analysis 
 
This brings us to the crucial issue of whether or not Argentina’s fiscal policy was 
adequate from a debt sustainability standpoint, and more importantly, whether the fiscal 
accounts were a plausible cause of the 2001 financial meltdown. To examine this issue, 
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two alternative simulations of debt sustainability are used, one following the standard 
debt dynamics framework of EASTERLY & FISHER [1990], and one following a simple 
sustainability model described in Annex II. Both models use a “gap approach”, that is 
determining the primary surplus compatible with a stable debt to GDP ratio (including 
both domestic and external debt) and comparing it with actual primary deficits for each 
period, but the main difference is the inclusion of export growth in the second model.  
 
As can be seen from Table 9, both approaches essentially tell the same story: irrespective 
of the treatment of the social security system, debt sustainability was questionable as 
early as 1999, but became a clear problem only in 2001. The adjustment made in 2000 is 
also visible from the calculations. An examination of the standard NPG (No-Ponzi-Game) 
solvency conditions both for domestic debtTP
33
PT and for external debtTP
34
PT point to the same 
conclusion: the solvency condition did not hold for domestic debt from 1998 onwards, 
whereas it was first breached for foreign debt in 2001 only. This would suggest that, 
although the government was able to marginally improve the (ex-social security) primary 
surplus to accommodate the increase in debt service in the second half of the 1990s, such 
adjustments were hardly sustainable over time given the growth, exports and interest 
rates parameters.  
 
The story becomes much clearer if direct and indirect effects of exchange rate 
overvaluation since 1996 are factored in the analysis of the government’s balance sheetTP
35
PT, 
as 70% of debt was denominated in US dollars while Government’s revenue was not, 
thereby implying undervalued measures of debt to GDP ratios: if interest-rate spreads 
are used in the sustainability analysis as a proxy for currency risk, then the debt-
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denoting the growth rate of real GDP and r denoting the real interest rate on domestic debt. This condition 
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cannot grow faster than the foreign interest rate. 
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Table 9. Debt Sustainability Calculations, 1994-2001  
(% GDP) 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Model 1 (Government budget constraint)          
Sustainable primary surplus  -1.0 3.1  -0.2 1.0 1.0 4.5 3.1 6.1 
Actual  surplus 0.1  -0.4  -1.1 0.3 0.5  -0.8 0.4  -1.5 
Actual surplus (excl. Social Security, ESC)  0.3  0.3 0.7 2.0 2.3 1.6 3.1 1.1 
Gap (necessary adjustment +)  -1.1 3.5 0.9  -1.1 0.5 5.3 2.7 7.6 
Gap ESC (necessary adjustment +)  -1.3 2.8 -0.9 -2.9 -1.3 2.9  0.0  5.0 
         
Model 2 (Fiscal & External constraint)          
Sustainable  primary  surplus -1.4 -1.6 -3.7 -3.1 -0.2  3.0  2.6  3.6 
Actual  surplus 0.1  -0.4  -1.1 0.3 0.5  -0.8 0.4  -1.5 
Actual surplus (excl. Social Security, ESC)  0.3  0.3 0.7  2 2.3 1.6 3.1 1.1 
Gap (necessary adjustment +)  -1.3  -1.4  -3.1  -3.9  -1.2  3.0  1.4  3.9 
Gap ESC (necessary adjustment +)  -1.5 -2.1 -4.9 -5.6 -3.0  0.6 -1.3  1.3 
 
UNotesU: 
Model 1 sustainability constraint: 
1 1 1 1 −
∗
∗

















































Where d=primary deficit/surplus, y=real GDP, b=real domestic debt, i=real interest rate on domestic debt, 
i*=real interest rate on foreign debt, and b*= real foreign debt 
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∆ ∆  
Where and x=real exports. In the case of export growth, a 3-year average has been used for the calculations. 
 
Note that in both models, the terms associated with seignorage revenue and exchange rate change do not 
appear as they are not relevant in Argentina’s case. The “gap” reported in Table 9 denotes the debt 




Table 10. Debt Sustainability Adjusted for Currency Risk, 1996-2001  
(% GDP) 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
(Model 2)         
Baseline sustainable primary surplus  -3.7  -3.1  -0.2  3.0  2.6  3.6 
Actual  surplus  -1.1 0.3 0.5  -0.8 0.4  -1.5 
Actual surplus (excl. Social Security,  ESC)  0.7  2 2.3 1.6 3.1 1.1 
Average  spreads  (basis  points)  374 329 530 630 627  1850 
Risk adjusted sustainable primary surplus  -3.5  -2.8 1.2 5.4 4.6  10.2 
Gap (necessary adjustment +)  -2.4  -3.1 0.7 6.1 4.2  11.7 
Gap ESC (necessary adjustment +)  -4.6 -5.3 -1.7  2.7  0.6  7.5 





 Could more fiscal adjustment have altered the situation and affected solvency 
expectations in a significant way ? Looking at Argentina’s fiscal record, the trivial 
answer is that as late as 2000-2001, it would have been economically, socially and 
politically difficult if not impossible to reach higher primary surpluses, especially when 
what was needed was beyond 3 or 4% of GDP. When an economy is already in deep 
recession, running a highly contractionary fiscal policy invariably has a negative impact 
on growth in the short run, and thus tends to lock the debt dynamics in an even more  
unsustainable path. This is precisely what happened when Fernando De la Rúa’s 
economic team introduced tax hikes in January 2000 (the “impuestazo”) and when 
Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo introduced a controversial financial transaction tax 
in April 2001
36. These drastic measures not only failed to deliver substantially more tax 
revenues, but also hampered economic activity. Believers in the “confidence game” à la 
Krugman
37 would argue, however, that a contractionary fiscal policy can be expansionary 
through its positive signaling effect on financial markets, thereby resulting in lower 
spreads and thus in lower interest rates, which may positively impact growth through 
investment.  But this eventually holds true as long as the market believes in the capacity 
of the economy to grow and in the capacity of the government to implement tight policies 
over time. Obviously, such conditions were not met in Argentina in 2000-2001, as growth 
prospects were bleak, macroeconomic management was showing increasing weaknesses, 
and governance problems
38 started to show. Under these circumstances, and in the face of 
an unsustainable debt path, relying on fiscal adjustment at that particular point in time 
was mostly an illusion: any fiscal tightening was bound to kill economic recovery and 
hence create further negative market sentiments, while any fiscal loosening was also 
likely to create negative market sentiments, illustrating the perverse nature of the debt 
sustainability trap when an economy is in deep recession. What was needed was a 
combination of growth and fiscal tightening, not one at the expense at the other, 
something that failed to materialize in Argentine. 
 
 
Conclusion - Although fiscal numbers did not exhibit abyssal deficits, the fiscal situation 
of Argentina was a growing source of concern throughout the late 1990s, especially if the 
real overvaluation of the peso is factored in the analysis. Arguably, fiscal imbalances 
were not very large, and were very much related to the economic recession during the 
later years. But fiscal policy was not consistent with debt dynamics when doubts about 
the currency regime started to increase. As a result, Argentina was glued in a trap of low 
growth, overvalued exchange rate, and increasing debt and rolling-over requirements. At 
that point, it was simply too late for effective fiscal adjustment. The focus on the policy 
timing is important to reconcile the existing views in the role of fiscal policy. With the 
benefit of hindsight, although MUSSA’s view [2002] that fiscal policy was “irresponsible” 
is too extreme, one can fully agree with PERRY & SÉRVEN [2002], that the boom years 
                                                 
36 One could also add the unsuccessful attempt to cut expenditures in 2001 by Economy Minister Lopéz-
Murphy, which resulted in his immediate ousting. 
37 As noted by KRUGMAN [1998] in the context of the East-Asian crisis, policy advise is often being 
ensnared in a “confidence game”, that is advising policies that will appeal to investor prejudices or to what 
investors believe are the prejudices of their colleagues. This makes for a tricky game of crystal ball gazing. 
38 An obvious illustration was the corruption scandal involving the Vice-president in 2000, leading to the 
resignation of the latter. 
  28from end 1995 to mid 1998 were a missed opportunity to address the structural fiscal 
imbalances of the country , especially at the level of fiscal federalism. If something could 
have been done on the fiscal front, it was definitely during those years. However, as the 
above discussion suggests, the alleged expansionary role of fiscal contraction can be a 
dangerous illusion when the debt is unsustainable and when economic policy 
management is fragile. Against this background, it would seem that there was not enough 
fiscal adjustment in Argentina in the lead up to the crisis, but perhaps also counter-
productive attempts when it was already too late. But the key point is that decisive trigger 
of the crisis was not truly fiscal. Domingo Cavallo’s tinkering with the rules of the 
currency board removed Argentina’s last bastion of credibility and convinced financial 
markets to rush to the exit door. 
 
 
4. Growth: the Weakest Link  
 
As illustrated in the analysis of debt sustainability and fiscal adjustment, growth (or the 
lack thereof) is one crucial item in the whole discussion, and certainly one of the triggers 
of the 2001 crisis. In this respect, Argentina’s experience is interesting as it reveals the 
inherent limitations of market reforms that looked impressive on paper but that failed to 
deliver. In a nutshell, Argentina’s growth performance in the 1990s very much reflected 
the major contradiction in the convertibility plan, i.e. relative macroeconomic stability 
despite large microeconomic imbalances, resulting in a lack of coherent development 
policy. 
 
a. Growth and Productivity Gains: Miracle or Illusion ? 
 
On the reform front, Argentina undertook what looks like one of the most spectacular and 
aggressive reform package of the Western Hemisphere in the early nineties, to revamp an 
economy marked by years of erratic economic policy. Together with the introduction of 
the Convertibility plan, the economy was quickly exposed to foreign competition with 
trade liberalization measures, rapid deregulation and the opening up of many economic 
sectors, the establishment of a liberal foreign investment regime and the elimination of 
price controls. The financial sector, plagued by the hyperinflation years of the 1980s, was 
modernized and substantially cleaned up after the banking crisis triggered by the Mexican 
peso meltdown in 1994.  
 
Furthermore, Argentina initiated a privatization process in 1989 that was at the forefront 
of the international experience. While most countries viewed infrastructure services as 
highly strategic, the Menem administration started by privatizing the big utilities, 
breaking with the traditional pro-state stance of the Peronist Party.  Given the 
straightjacket imposed by the Convertibility plan, the breadth of the sectoral changes and 
their very swift implementation were mostly driven by fiscal reasons
39. Throughout the 
first three years of the Convertibility plan, the Government divested of 90% of the all 
                                                 
39 CHISARI, O., ESTACHE, A., ROMERO, C., “Winners and losers from Utilities Privatization: Lessons from a 
General Equilibrium Model in Argentina”,  Centro de Estudios Económicos de la Regulación (Buenos 
Aires), Working Paper No.3. March 1999, p.4. 
  29state enterprises for the equivalent of more than US$20 billion, which helped clean up the 
different debts and liabilities. This constituted a genuine “shock therapy” for some 
sectors of the Argentine economy, as employment in privatized enterprises was reduced 
by 55%, with large reductions in the railways, oil and steel sectors. 
 
This cocktail of liberalization cum deregulation policies produced impressive results 
during the golden period of the Convertibility plan. From 1991 to 1994, the investment 
ratio to GDP increased sharply, and more importantly total factor productivity (TFP) 
grew by 21% (Charts 14 and 15). After the Tequila crisis shock, the same pattern was 
observed until 1997, but the productivity dramatically collapsed afterwards. Investment 
plummeted, driven by rising real interest rates. Worse, in the post-crisis year of 2002, 
total factor productivity had almost reached the pre-convertibility level of year 1990, 
after a ten year positive “bubble”, and productivity stood at just 32% of the US level
40. 
 
Chart 14. Investment Ratio     Chart 15. Total Factor Productivity  
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As shown in Chart 16, real GDP growth and TFP changes followed a very similar pattern 
throughout the Convertibility Plan, indicating that real growth was heavily influenced by 
productivity swings. Interestingly, capital productivity change remained fairly flat 
throughout the period whereas labor productivity generally declined despite a rebound 
between 1995 and 1997. Evidence on productivity gains is actually very heterogeneous at 
the company level, as it turns out that the overall increase in factor productivity was not 
the result of improvements in all sectors of the economy. In fact, the direct impact of the 
“shock therapy” reforms of the early nineties explains most of the productivity “bubble”, 
as productivity gains were confined to newly privatized sectors of the economy (the big 
                                                 
40 The McKinsey Quaterley  No.2, 2002. 
  30utilities in particular), reflecting drastic downsizing in some former states monopolies and 
acquisition of new technologies and business practices. However, these gains remained 
largely one-off occurrences, as productivity generally declined after 1996 in these very 
same sectors, as shown in Chart 17.  
 
Chart 16. Real GDP growth     Chart 17. Productivity Growth by  
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Source: MAIA & NICHOLSON (MECON) [2003]      Source : MCKINSEY [2002] 
 
 
In other sectors of the economy, the picture is mixed, as half of the firms (large 
enterprises and SMEs alike) recorded total factor productivity declines between 1992 and 
1998, despite the more stable macroeconomic environment provided by the 
Convertibility Plan
41. This suggests that productivity growth was highly concentrated in a 
few firms and sectors while negative firms with negative productivity changes spanned 
across the whole economy
42. Firm level data also reveals that productivity gains were 
biased towards the non-tradable sectors whereas value added changes were negative in 
the tradable sectors (Table 11). This reflects the fact that foreign direct investment flows 
have primarily targeted non-tradable sectors in Argentina, as suggested  by Chart 18, as a 
result of high relative non-tradable prices. Such an allocation of resources not only had 
serious implications for the trade balance, but also feeds into the real exchange rate 
overvaluation issue discussed in section IIb: a productivity improvement in the non-
tradables goods actually moves the equilibrium real exchange rate downward, thereby 




                                                 
41 See BOUR [2002]. 
42 Idem, p.9. 
43 Note again that this line of reasoning implies that the real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of  non-
tradables prices to tradables prices. 
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Table 11. Changes in Value Added and Sources of Growth 
(National Survey of Large Enterprises, 1993-1998) 
 
  Value added 
Change (%) 
Contributions  (in %)  Number  of 
enterprises 
   Labor Capital  TFP  
By product orientation          
 Non-Tradable  5.2 9.4  23.6  22.2  87 
 Tradable  -1.2 1.2  0.6  -3.0  219 
By individual export performance          
 Little change in exports  -13.8 1.7  -1.5  -13.9  93 
 Moderate growth in exports  8.5 2.5  5.2  0.9  89 
 High growth in exports  22.9 4.3  4.8  13.9  32 
Source: BOUR [2002] (Table 8, p.11) 
 
 


























Source : Dir. Nac. De Cuentas Internacionales 
 
 
What explains this apparent productivity puzzle ? Although in-depth studies of the 
phenomenon are yet to be conducted, it seems that four pervasive market distortions 
hampered economic development and productivity in Argentina. First, tax evasion, 
which has already been discussed in the previous section, and which clearly biases 
competition. It has been recently estimated that in some key sectors of the economy such 
as meat processing and construction, tax evasion accounts for about 45 to 55% of the 
country’s huge productivity gap with the United States
44. Second, the lack of proper 
                                                 
44 MacKinsey Quarterly, op.cit. 2002. 
  32regulation and competition frameworks in several sectors of the economy. In 
telecommunications and water, regulatory commissions have simply been captured by the 
largest firms operating in these markets
45, while in other sectors, a multitude of 
(sometimes overlapping) regulatory barriers are biasing competition in favor of small 
inefficient companies.  In this respect, the hands-off approach adopted by the architects 
of the Convertibility Plan in the context of the privatization program has essentially 
resulted in a transfer of economic rents, but has failed to generate more competition. 
Oddly enough, the massive privatization scheme has favored big industrial conglomerates 
while excessive regulations and high tax pressure have severely handicapped SMEs 
operating in the formal sector.  The third distortion is the rigidity of labor market 
regulations, which has severely limited price adjustments and made recourse to flexible 
job contracts extremely difficult. As a result, the country suffered from an unsustainable 
combination of persistent current account deficits throughout the 1990s (3.5% of GDP on 
average) and rising unemployment levels. The effects on labor market rigidities on output 
and employment were indeed dramatic. First, in the absence of relative price adjustments 
(both at the level of the real exchange rate and wages), shocks were absorbed through 
large output contraction, at the expense of employment
46; second, most investment 
decisions made by large companies in the early 1990s did factor in relatively high direct 
and indirect labor costs in using more capital-intensive technology, which in turn 
negatively affected unskilled and non-unionized workers
47. As a result, although 
industrial production increased by 43% from 1991 to 1998, industrial employment 
contracted by 17%. In general, this situation led to a spectacular rise in unemployment  as 
well as a worsening of the income distribution. The fourth distortion is the high cost of 
bank lending in real terms, owing to a combination of high administrative costs 
stemming from the low monetization of the economy (29% GDP), inefficiencies of the 
payment system, credit risk and sizable provisioning expenses associated with non-
performing loans, as pointed out in section II. These problems reflect the 
underdevelopment of domestic financial markets in Argentina, despite significant 
improvement over the last decade, which have exacerbated the credit crunch effects of 




These distortions are typical examples of the kind of “illiberal enclaves” pointed out by  
WISE & ROETT [2000], together with delays in implementing structural reforms at the 
provincial level, which were politically necessary to gain support for the Convertibility 
plan. The political economy of reforms made some trade-offs necessary but the net result 
was that the macroeconomic credibility of the convertibility plan clashed with serious 
microeconomic problems present in most regions of Argentina.  
 
                                                 
45 WISE & ROETT [2000], p.109. See also MANZETTI [1997] for an overview of privatization and regulation 
in Chile and Argentina, 
46 For an interesting comparison between Argentina and Hong-Kong under a currency board regime, see 
Quarterly Bulletin 5/2002, Hong-Kong Monetary Authority, pp.5-6. The main conclusion is that the short-
run effect of output decline on unemployment was twice as large in Argentina as in Hong-Kong during the 
1990s. 
47 See BAER, ELOSEGUI & GALLO [2002], p.69. 
48 See CABALLERO [2000], pp.10-18. 
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b. Capital Inflows: of Economic Booms and Sudden Stops 
 
Argentina is also a good example of the excessive dependence on capital inflows, which 
not only led to a booming economy through consumption and investment channels, but 
made the economy extremely vulnerable to reversals. As in the case of East-Asian 
countries in the early 1990s, capital account opening and financial deregulation, 
combined with low interest rates in the US and Japan, favored increased capital flows to 
Argentina. These flows were initially a welcome supplement to national savings to 
finance investment and growth, but their role evolved from additionality to partial 
substitution:  the share of FDI in total investment increased from 9% on average in 1991-
1995 to 22.9% on average from 1996 to2000; likewise, national saving remained subdued 
in the first half the nineties and decreased after 1995 whereas foreign saving had to make 
up for the rest and accounted for 21% of domestic saving between 1996 and 2000 (Chart 
19). Other economic indicators suggest that sustained high consumption, low domestic 
saving and rapid domestic credit expansion illustrate the impact of net capital inflows: as 
shown in Chart 20, consumption remained fairly stable throughout the 1990s, accounting 
for more than 80% of GDP, whereas domestic saving remained very low (18.5% of GDP 
on average). Interestingly, the share of  domestic credit to GDP almost doubled during 





Chart 19. National and Foreign Saving  Chart 20. Selected Economic Ratios 
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Source: IFS, MECON 
 




Although the share of non-FDI inflows in total capital flows decreased throughout the 
decade, the dependency of Argentina upon capital flows makes it an ideal candidate for 
the well-known “sudden stop” story  à la  Calvo: a large and unexpected reduction in 
capital flows may well trigger huge shocks on investment, credit and consumption, 
ultimately putting at risk private and public solvency
49. As the argument goes (CALVO et 
al. [2002]), the massive capital inflows to Latin America in the early 1990s all of a 
sudden came to a standstill following Russia’s financial crisis and its subsequent partial 
debt default in August 1998. Two factors were at play: first, a emerging market aversion 
factor among foreign investors, and second, higher US interest rates during the second 
half of the 1990s. This forced drastic current account adjustments in the whole region as 
well as real exchange rate realignments in countries such as Brazil and Chile. This would 
suggest that Argentina’s agony was triggered by capital flows “sudden stop” , i.e. by 
exogenous factors. Does the story hold in the case of Argentina, and why Argentina 
versus other countries? From a purely factual perspective, this argument does not quite 
hold. First of all, although sovereign spreads increased sharply in all Latin American 
countries following the Russian default, Argentina’s spreads remained below those of 
Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador until the end of 2000. Brazil’s spreads were even 
significantly higher in 1998-1999. Arguably, Mexican spreads decreased gradually below 
that of Argentina after the last quarter of 1999, but on average, Argentina did not suffer 
from more market aversion than other LAC countries. This is reflected in the behavior of 
capital inflows: as shown in Chart 21, Argentina continued to attract more capital flows 
as share of GDP than other countries, even with the “sudden stop” effect, until the late 
2000. In addition, the current account adjustment which followed the 1998 capital 
crunch, was actually very small in Argentina in 1999, compared to that of Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia or Ecuador
50. Yet, during the same period, Argentina’s economy performed 
worse than all the other countries of the region. This suggests that the “sudden stop” 
story was not at the root of Argentina’s economic meltdown, although certainly acted as 
an amplifier of the domestic problems discussed in relation with productivity trends
51.  In 
other words, the reduction of capital inflows in Argentina was not an exogenous trigger 
of the crisis. If anything, it signaled the end of the illusion with regard to the 
sustainability of the Convertibility Plan.  
 
 
                                                 
49 See CALVO [1998] and [2002] for the full demonstration of the argument. The term “sudden stop” was 
coined by DORNBUSH et alt. [1995], inspired by a banker’s adage “it is not speed that kills, it is the sudden 
stop”. 
50 According to CALVO et alt. [2002], p.11, the current account change in percentage of 1998 imports was 
of 6.1% for Argentina, versus 10.6% in Brazil, 18.8% in Chile, 31.3% in Colombia and almost 50% in 
Ecuador. It is only in 2001 that current account adjustment has really hit Argentina, with a 21% change 
compared to 1998. 
51 See PERRY & SERVÉN [2002], for an in-depth presentation of this point, including tests on the empirical 
determinants of capital inflows between 1997 and 2001. 
  35Conclusion – Despite an ambitious reform package implemented in the early nineties, 
growth was really the “missing link” in Argentina’s experiment of the 1990s. Impressive 
capital inflows throughout most of the 1990s associated with a spectacular privatization 
program and half–implemented reforms did not transform the economy into a 
competitive efficient one. As a result, total factor productivity declined over time, leading 
to an unstable growth pattern. On the face of it, it is hard to understand that Argentina 
could be made out as an economic development model. Argentina’s reforms remained 
confined to liberalization and deregulation, which were certainly necessary but by no 
means sufficient conditions for economic take-off. In retrospect, the striking feature of 
the Convertibility Plan is the absence of a coherent development strategy to steer the 





















































































































  365. Some Policy Lessons 
 
As argued in the previous sections, the Argentine default was ultimately the result of a 
combination of different factors, in which the currency board arrangement played a 
significant role, both directly and indirectly. It also took place in the context of volatile 
capital markets and spillover effects from other financial crises in emerging markets. As 
such, the Argentine story raises some fundamental policy questions for developing 
countries: the first one is the cost-benefit analysis of capital account convertibility for 
emerging countries; the second is the never-ending puzzle of what constitutes an optimal 
exchange rate regime; the third is the risks of debt financing for long-term growth, and 
the last one is the role of the International Financial Institutions in terms of policy advice 
and possible stopgap measures.  
 
a. Capital Account Convertibility : Pitfalls on the Eldorado Road 
 
What the recent crises confirm is that there seems to exist a trade-off between the benefits 
of a rapidly evolving and largely unregulated financial system attracting large portfolio 
investments and the costs of financial vulnerability. This not totally a surprise: although 
economic theory tells us that the opening of domestic capital markets offers more 
opportunities to diversify risks and seek other investment prospects, capital flows may 
also create problems if they only serve to finance a consumption boom, following a 
typical “boom-bust” cycle. Therefore, domestic effects of foreign capital flows are 
heavily dependent upon absorption capacities, the efficiency of the banking system, and 
the productivity of investments. 
 
It is often believed that capital account convertibility is associated with short term costs 
and long term gains. It may not be that simple. First, there is mixed evidence that capital 
account liberalization promotes long-run economic growth. Some studies have found a 
stable positive correlation between growth and indicators of financial development, but 
others identify considerable geographical variation
52. Recent research finds that although 
international financial integration is associated with economic growth (high levels of 
GDP per capita and strong institutions), empirical evidence does not support the view that 
international integration stimulates economic growth
53. Some studies actually suggest 
that the effect of financial opening on the relative volatility of consumption is non-linear, 
showing negative effects for most developing countries but positive effects for 
industrialized countries
54. The evidence is therefore not convincing so far, as it is difficult 
to isolate financial integration from a whole set of institution building issues.  The risks 
involved actually reinforce the argument for serious financial reforms. This is actually 
what happened in the aftermath of most banking crises in the past, especially in Latin 
America, as illustrated by a recent empirical study, which finds that financial 
                                                 
52 See EDISON, KLEIN et al. [2002] for a survey of the empirical literature to date, or MALHOTRA[1997]. 
53 See EDISON, LEVINE et al. [2002]. 
54 See KOSE et alt. [2003]. The results of the study show that although , on average, the volatility of output 
growth has, on average, decline in the 1990s relative to the three earlier decades, the volatility of 
consumption growth relative to output income growth has increased for more financially integrated 
developing countries in the 1990s.  
  37liberalization fuels institutional reforms, typically in the aftermath of crises
55. Quite 
disturbingly, this would suggest that there is a learning-by-doing trend in financial 
development, which makes crises almost unavoidable. Yet, the experience of the 1990s 
calls for caution regarding this “Shumpeterian view” of financial crises, as the destruction 
of institutions and the credibility damages associated therewith can prove difficult to 
overcome from a political economy perspective, as evidenced by the case of Argentina.  
 
To sum up, the link between “short-term pain” and “long-term gain” may not be linear, 
and as put by BHAGWATI [2002] in an essay exploring the “capital myth” (pp.6-7), “any 
nation contemplating the embrace of free capital mobility […] must reckon with these 
costs and weight them by the not negligible probability of running into a crisis”. In crude 
terms, the cost-benefit analysis of international financial integration looks like a puzzle 
with missing pieces: on the one hand, short-term costs are pretty clear and unfortunately 
well documented, but on the other hand, the long-term benefits are intuitively plausible 
yet not empirically robust. As the case of Argentina sadly illustrates, sustainable financial 
integration requires careful institution building in order to design appropriate regulations 
and supervision instruments, because financial systems are subject to currency risks 
regardless of the exchange regime adopted by a country
56. Such a process obviously takes 
time and is not easy to “model”. It is about time to fully recognize this crucial dimension.  
 
 
b. Debt Financing: are there Alternatives to the “Original Sin” ? 
 
One of the eye-catching features of the Argentine crisis is that even if one country’s debt 
ratios to GDP appear to be “reasonable” by world standards, a classic debt crisis is not 
precluded. To a large extent, the precipice-flirting episode of Brazil in the Summer of 
2002 is very similar. Arguably, the colossal debt-service ratios signaled clear 
vulnerabilities in terms of liquidity in both countries but not in terms of long-term 
solvency.  One important element in the equation is the “original sin”, i.e. borrowing in 
US dollars as opposed to domestic currency, which creates severe balance sheet 
mismatches
57 although dollar interest rates are often lower than domestic ones. 
CABALLERO & KRISHNAMURTY [2002] argue that the choice over liability denomination 
is equivalent to a choice over how much insurance to purchase against countries when 
international collateral is scarce. According to their analysis, most emerging and 
developing countries suffer from financial underdevelopment, which reduces domestic 
liquidity and jack up financial volatility. This distortion ultimately leads to 
“underinsurance” against external crises by the private sector, i.e. excessive external 
borrowing in Dollar, especially when foreign capital is abundant. Other distortions can 
amplify the “underinsurance” problem, such as bailout expectations or implicit/explicit 
policy commitments to rule out currency devaluation. In this respect, the effect of the 
Convertibility Plan was very similar to the implicit commitment by East-Asian Central 
Banks to absorb the risks of exchange rate movements on behalf of investors. Two main 
lessons can be drawn from the underinsurance problem: the first is that financial 
                                                 
55 KAMINSKY & SCHMULKER [2002]. 
56 See BURDISSO et alt. [2002]. 
57 See HAUSMANN, PANIZZA & STEIN [2001], p.401 
  38deepening is badly needed in domestic markets, which involves once again a crucial 
institution building dimension, as pointed out above. The second is that there may be a 
less stringent role for monetary and exchange rate policies than the compulsive concern 
about inflation targets. What is needed in most countries is both price stability and some 
exchange rate flexibility, but until a certain threshold where further debt accumulation 
leads to lower growth, which can be depicted in a kind of Laffer curve. Empirically,  
recent research conducted by PATILLO  et alt. [2002] for 93 developing countries 
(including Argentina) over the period 1969-1998 confirms the non-linear effect of debt 
on growth, and finds that the average impact of debt on per capita growth appears to 
become negative for debt levels above 160-170% of exports and 35-40% of GDP. 
Interestingly, although it is extremely difficult to identify a clear turning point, it would 
seem that for the average country in the sample, doubling the debt level would reduce 
growth, suggesting that the average country is already on the “wrong” side of the debt 
Laffer curve. Quantification exercises are always difficult, especially in the context of 
panel data where country specifics are highly diluted, yet they provide some useful 
illustration of the possible limitations of debt financing in the institutional and political 
context of most developing countries. As to the second question, i.e. the effect of growth 
on debt, it is trivially linked to liquidity and solvency issues. Empirical research 
(EASTERLY [2001]) indicates that between 1975 and 1994, slow growth was an obvious 
trigger for debt accumulating policies in most countries, reflecting a lack of fiscal 
adjustment. Debt explosion was thus the counterpart of growth “implosion”, but more 
importantly, this type of relationship helps understand why some debt levels that were 
sustainable under a previous growth regime can very well become unsustainable under a 
new regime, ultimately playing an important role in triggering a crisis. Argentina was a 
perfect illustration of this paradox in 2001. 
 
To sum up, excessive reliance on debt financing –including multilateral debt- is a serious 
concern, especially in the light of financial market underdevelopment. Limiting the 
“original sin” problem is certainly desirable in order to limit currency mismatch, and this 
can be done through a variety of ways. But more importantly, it seems urgent to adopt 
more prudent debt management strategies in general. Both in terms of levels and debt 
service implications. In particular, it is crucial to become more realistic about growth 
assumptions used in classic debt sustainability analyses in order to better gauge the non-
linear relationship between growth and debt. 
 
c. Exchange Rate Regime: Beyond the “Fixed versus Flexible” Debate 
 
The debate about appropriate exchange rate regimes has raged over the last decade, and 
issues have been discussed at great length. It not only focused on the merits of alternative 
regimes in disinflation programs, but also on the costs of failure, on credibility and on 
reputational issues. But in practice, the series of recent currency crises both in industrial 
countries (the EMS crisis in 1992/93) and in emerging countries - broadly defined - 
(Mexico in 1995, East-Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2001/02) has 
revealed the inherent fragility of fixed or semi-fixed rates. This is much more serious 
than previously thought with the integration of world capital markets.  The implication is 
straightforward: for most countries, the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rate 
  39is becoming increasingly irrelevant. As documented in OBSFELD & ROGOFF [1995] and 
confirmed by the Argentine tragedy, aside from a few minor tourist economies, oil 
sheikdom and heavily dependent principalities, few fixed exchange rates have survived 
the past several years intact
58. One is therefore left with various degrees of exchange rate 
floating, but it is well known that flexible rates tend to be extremely volatile in emerging 
economies, as are wages and prices, with large balance sheet effects on liabilities 
expressed in foreign currency. Between floating and the “fear of floating”, are there 
alternatives available ? The short answer is “not really”. Different combinations and 
exchange regimes have be tried, but all have their drawbacks over time. This has 
prompted suggestions to “import” exchange stability by simply adopting another 
country’s legal tender, i.e. dollarization
59. However, full dollarization is just an extreme 
form of exchange rate fixing, and does not constitute a viable “alternative” to the 
exchange rate puzzle discussed before. The logic of dollarization, i.e. no currency, no 
exchange rate risk, no crisis, is exactly what was behind Argentina’s Convertibility Plan. 
However, as is well known from the optimal currency area literature, the sustainability of 
this type of arrangement depends on various factors including trade openness, economic 
structure and types of economic shocks. In this respect, unless an economy is sufficiently 
integrated with the US economy, permanent adoption of the US Dollar as the sole legal 
tender may not be sustainable in terms of competitiveness. In addition, economic 
adjustment in the face of economic shocks relies exclusively on fiscal policy, which is 
not only slow but also politically delicate. In other words, dollarization may well take 
care of the currency risk but does by no means remove the country risk.  All this means 
that the straightjacket imposed by dollarization may prove unbearable unless domestic 
markets are extremely flexible so as to allow quick relative price adjustments, a condition 
which few emerging countries meet. Interestingly, although the jury is still out in both 
Ecuador and El Salvador (the most recent cases of dollarization), the overvaluation of 
their real exchange rate is already threatening their international and regional 
competitiveness, creating friction between their trade and non-trade sectors. If exchange 
rate stability is to be achieved, working out some regional arrangements concomitant 
with existing trade frameworks (e.g. Mercosur) would seem to make more sense than 
responding to what WYPLOSZ [2002b] coined as being a “gringo complex”.   
 
The menu of options available to emerging countries to limit large exchange rate swings 
also include capital and exchange controls. Both measures are different as are the likely 
consequences. Basically, capital "controls" can take the form of diverse restrictions on 
                                                 
58 If one excludes the two CFA Franc zones in Western and Central Africa, tied to the EURO through a 
French Treasury guarantee, as well as oil sheikdoms, small islands and highly dependent principalities, the 
list is limited to approximately 15 countries according to the IMF classification of exchange rate 
arrangements in 2002. 
59 See SCHULER, K. "Encouraging Official Dollarization in Emerging Markets," Staff Report, Office of the 
Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, April 1999. Note that although the terms “currency 
substitution” and “dollarization” are often used in the literature to describe the extent to which foreign 
money (currency and deposits) substitutes for domestic money in its three traditional functions (unit of 
account, medium of exchange, and store-of-value), what is referred to in this discussion is the adoption of 
the US Dollar (or any major currency) as the sole legal tender for all transactions, i.e. full dollarization. 
  40capital flows (traditionally, inflows) or taxes on certain capital transactions
60, and limit 
the degree of capital account convertibility. Exchange controls can take equally different 
forms, but essentially limit the availability or use of foreign exchange as such. These 
measures mostly affect current account transactions (for residents or non-residents) but 
the distinction is sometimes much more complicated. Obvious examples of exchange 
controls include limited internal convertibility
61, or foreign exchange surrender 
requirements for exporters which is a particular case. The effectiveness of all these 
measures -capital controls and exchange restrictions- is subject to a large debate, but 
experience suggests that they tend to be difficult as well as costly to enforce over time. 
The case for a tax on capital transactions, aimed at limiting speculative inflows and 
outflows, is certainly the most sensible proposal since it is market-based, whereas the 
others are more distortionary and may foster the development of black foreign exchange 
markets. Yet, they might offer some breathing space as stopgap measures, but they can 
only have some credibility if they are associated with serious structural reforms to 
strengthen the domestic financial system. In other words, it should be clear that capital 
and exchange controls are not a substitute for reform. Likewise, if they are used in the 
context of an overvalued exchange rate, they may well evolve from a temporary defense 
against speculation into a permanent system of trade protection
62.  
 
To sum up, at this juncture, there is no magic bullet which can alleviate the “fear of 
floating” syndrome, except perhaps some stopgap measures such as market-based 
exchange controls in the short-run, and some better regional coordination as a medium-
run objective. However, stopgap measures offer no lasting solution per se, as their 
credibility heavily depends on the reform context in which they are put in place. 
 
 
d. The Role of the IFIs: A Perception Failure ? 
 
One of the most specific features of the Argentine tragedy is that the country operated 
almost continuously under the auspices of close scrutiny of an IMF-supported program 
between 1991 and 2001
63. The IMF was heavily involved in exchange rate, fiscal and 
monetary policies, as well as in debt sustainability assessments, and no “country 
ownership” type of public relation arguments can alter this fact. In no other country, 
except for Russia (1998) and Brazil (2002) did the IMF provide exceptionally large 
financial support to a member already under a IMF-supported program. Under the 
different stand-by and other arrangements, the IMF agreed to disburse about US$ 24 
billion to Argentina between 1991 and 2001, and most of it was effectively drawn.  The 
involvement of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank has been 
                                                 
60 A widely publicized example is Chile, which imposed a one-year minimum holding period on capital 
inflows larger than US$10'000 as well as a 10% unremunerated reserve requirement (also with a one-year 
minimum holding period) for all external liabilities that do not result in an increase in the stock of capital. 
Restrictions have been removed gradually and eliminated in July 2001. 
61 The issue of convertibility hides a minefield of technical ambiguities. Here, internal convertibility is 
defined as the ability of residents to acquire and maintain domestic holdings of assets denominated in 
foreign currencies without any restriction.   
62 EDWARDS [1995]. See also KRUGMAN [1998].   
63 MUSSA [2002], p.3. 
  41equally deep throughout the decade with steady disbursements focusing on social 
developments and institution building. To the extent that the Argentine tragedy is a 
classic debt crisis, both the IMF and the World Bank were intimately involved, and this 
raises some questions about the role of these institutions in the lead-up to the crisis. In 
particular, the Fund’s main explanation for previous slips in other crises –that it was 
practicing “battlefield medicine”-is less credible in this case
64. Which policy 
recommendations did the Fund prescribe or perhaps failed to prescribe to prevent the 
Argentine default ? The official ex-post story is that the IMF indeed bears some 
responsibility in the crisis, for not having pressed for more stringent fiscal adjustment all 
along, and for being unusually lax with Argentina
65. Given the peculiar fiscal regime of 
Argentina covered in section III, this point is certainly well taken, especially after the 
Tequila crisis. It is all the more puzzling because under a currency board arrangement, 
fiscal policy becomes the only tool of macroeconomic management, in particular for 
would-be buyers of new debt. Yet, it has to be replaced in the political context of the late 
1990s, where Argentina was the “poster child” of economic reforms, and where the 
currency board arrangements was praised as being one possible ultimate fix. The address 
of President Menem at the IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in October 1999, was the 
ultimate recognition of the “good reformer” status of Argentina. However, during the two 
years preceding the crisis, it is not the lack of fiscal surveillance which is to blame, but 
perhaps the excessive reliance on the simplistic mechanics of fiscal adjustment for debt 
dynamics purposes, as argued in section IIIc. Arguably, it is not obvious that something 
else could be attempted apart from debt restructuring, because it was already too late. 
 
Apart from the fiscal dimension, one other area of policy advice deserves scrutiny, i.e. 
exchange rate policy. Interestingly, MUSSA [2002] reports that the IMF was initially 
opposed to the peso-dollar parity and was reluctant to back the Convertibility plan, which 
was a personal creation of Domingo Cavallo. Whatever the founding myth behind the 
Convertibility Plan, what is certainly moot is the Fund’s apparent absence of questioning 
of the adequacy and sustainability of the arrangement over time. Eventually the IMF 
ended up massively supporting a non-viable arrangement. Once again, given the well-
known fiscal weaknesses in Argentina, excessive faith in a system allowing continuous 
borrowing in dollars at an overvalued exchange rate was a daring gamble. Although there 
was no obvious  way out to the exchange rate situation of Argentina, the IMF stance vis-
à-vis the sustainability of the currency board is at best puzzling, at worst symptomatic of 
the debt trap which bound together both the Argentine authorities and the Fund to each 
other. 
 
Lastly, when the crisis is in the making with high capital market volatility, is there a role 
for large IMF packages such as the one granted to Argentina in 2001 ? The “lender of last 
resort” issue has been discussed at length since the East-Asian and Russian crises
66, and it 
is widely understood that the IMF appears ill-equipped to fulfill that role. It cannot print 
money, it cannot lend freely - its loans being sliced into tranches subject to policy 
conditionalities, it does not lend at penal interest rates against collateral, and lastly, its 
                                                 
64 The Economist, 28 September 2002. 
65 MUSSA [2002]. 
66 See RADELET & SACHS [1998], BUCHS [2004]. 
  42resources are limited. Beyond feasibility questions, there are also major desirability 
issues. It is not obvious that a credible lender of last resort would do much in the case of 
self-fulfilling panic, because the presence alone of the IMF on the scene gives all the 
confidence of seeing an ambulance outside one's door, and its “signaling effect” for 
further investment lending (“catalytic official finance”) appears at best limited
67. In fact, 
its record of intervention shows that it has never been the main lender of last resort
68. In 
the Peso crisis in 1995 for instance, the United States provided most of the rescue funds, 
and in East-Asia, the IMF "bail-outs" were modest compared to capital outflows. In the 
case of Russia, the "package" of international lenders was even smaller, with $22.6 
billion in new credits spread over 1998 and 1999, including a $11.2 billion new IMF 
loan. In the case of Brazil in the Summer of 2002, when debt sustainability was suddenly 
questioned in the light of the possible outcome of the upcoming presidential elections, the 
IMF package came up with a $30 billion loan, “incidentally” the size of the cumulated 
exposure of the four major US investment banks on Brazil. Second, there is a chance that 
IMF interventions increase “moral hazard” problems in bailing out losers and distorting 
market rules, as argued in the “Metzler Report”
 69.  Although one can easily dismiss the 
cost implication of bailouts given the small size of funds disbursed so far and the good 
repayment record of crisis countries
70, the moral hazard argument is sometimes 
overplayed. To date, the only “classic” example of moral hazard is the Russian crisis in 
1998, where foreign investors took breathtaking risks on the Russian Treasury Bill 
market until the very last minute, not only because it was highly profitable, but also on 
the expectation  that Russia was too big to fail
71. When it comes to other recent financial 
crises including Argentina’s in 2001, it is difficult to make a strong case for moral hazard 
problems, however, as investors’ position declined steadily throughout 2001. But even if 
one accepts the relevance of moral hazard in some cases, how to address the issue is a 
totally different story. Unfortunately, one of the lessons of the Argentine crisis is that 
having an alternative “hands-off’ approach can easily fuel investors panic in other 
countries and indirectly contribute to propagating the crisis at the regional level, as it 
happened in Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil in 2002. While on the one hand, international 
bailouts may be a contributing factor to financial crises through moral hazard effects, on 
the other hand, the absence of bailouts may have exactly the same effect because of 
financial contagion problem.  
 
Obviously, financial crisis management is a complex issue and it is difficult to come up 
with simple quick-fixes. It would seem, however, that when a country faces a pretty 
serious debt stock problem, the room for debt flow adjustments may be very limited and 
only postpone the problem. The only solution in such extreme case is to finally tackle the 
stock problem. In this respect, the current debate about the feasibility of a sovereign 
                                                 
67 See COTTARELLI & GIANNINI [2002]. 
68 See SACHS & RADELET [1998], p.34, and "Toward a New Financial System", The Economist, 11 April 
1998, pp.64-66.  
69 See JEANNE  &  ZETTLEMEYER [2001], and  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS  ADVISORY 
COMMISSION [2000] 
70 See JEANNE & ZETTLEMEYER [2001]. 
71 See BLUSTEIN [2001]. 
  43bankruptcy scheme in conjunction with various forms of market-based approaches 
(exchange offers and collection action clauses) is promising, albeit politically sensitive
72. 
 
At this juncture many questions remain with respect to the role of the IFIs and the IMF in 
particular before and during the Argentine meltdown. In retrospect, it would appear that 
the risks involved in the Currency Board arrangement had not been properly assessed, 
both in terms of fiscal and exchange rate policies, and in terms of an overall growth 
strategy. This is certainly a perception failure involving all “partners in development” in 
a context of market euphoria. In terms of crisis management, one may argue that 
designing an operational international bankruptcy framework represents the ultimate acid 





6. Conclusion: Has the Nature of Crises really Changed ?  
 
Economic history is awash with financial crises, many of which happened in or affected 
directly Argentina. The 2001 default was particularly severe and disruptive, and certainly 
has far-reaching consequences for the social, political and economic reconstruction of the 
country. However, it seems that the nature of the crisis was nothing really new. In 
essence, the 2001 Argentine crisis fits in the pattern of the 1990s crises, where greater 
financial integration increased the volatility of capital flows and generated large spillover 
effects across emerging markets. Capital volatility, triggered by monetary policy in the 
US and homegrown factors, was indeed the general context of the 2001 default, and as 
argued in section IVb, capital flows retrenchment certainly acted as an amplifier but not 
as a trigger for the crisis. The very nature of the crisis is not fundamentally different from 
the pattern of inconsistent macroeconomic policies which triggered many of the 
speculative attacks against the Peso in the 1970s and the 1980s
73. Although the problem 
was for once not monetary, the time inconsistency problem of the exchange rate policy 
followed between 1991 and 2001, together with the lack of nationally coherent fiscal and 
development policies, led to a classic debt solvency trap. From this perspective, the 2001 
default does not provide for a new “type” of crisis. Despite less obvious features than in 
the 1980s for instance, the end of the Convertibility Plan was a classic balance of 
payment crisis triggered by unsustainable policies in a much more volatile external 
environment. This being said, the real sector of the economy during the 1990s is certainly 
one of the most overlooked elements in the crisis, and certainly led to overoptimistic 
expectations about the capacity of the Argentine economy to rebound. In addition, even if 
the 2001 crisis was not fundamentally different from previous crisis episodes, its 
subsequent handling in 2002 proved dramatic for the entire financial system of the 
country. 
 
However, as shown in section III, it is fair to recognize that the decisive elements in debt 
sustainability involved a fair amount of judgment, and were ambiguous to most observers 
                                                 
72 See KRUEGER [2001]. 
73 See CHOUEREI & KAMINSKY [1999] 
  44before 2001. Risks were clearly present, but as always, the trigger occurs when the 
“market” decides that the debt is no longer sustainable, and subsequently validates it. 
Arguably, the situation deteriorated in Argentina in 2000-2001 and the floodgate were 
opened when changes were introduced in the Convertibility Plan framework, but the 
structural vulnerabilities of the country were by no means new. The rest is a matter of 
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ANNEX I 
 
Estimation of the Real Equilibrium Exchange Rate in Argentina  
1990-2001 
 
The concept of real equilibrium exchange rates has generated a large body of literatureTP
74
PT, 
driven by the emerging consensus that the standard purchasing power parity (PPP) is not 
an appropriate model of real equilibrium exchange rates owing to persistent deviations 
from PPP, which may be explained by permanent real shocks. The most famous 
examples include productivity differentials, based on the Samuelson-Balassa hypothesis, 
as well as the underlying net foreign assets position, which determines whether the 
exchange rate is consistent with the current account balance. These effects have been 
traditionally integrated in simple two good/two country models, where the real 
equilibrium exchange rate clears both internal and external balances. In these standard 
models, the real equilibrium exchange rates is defined as follows,  ) , ( n nfa F e = , nfa 
denoting the net foreign assets position and n the relative sectoral prices between 
countries. More recently, other sources of deviations from PPP have been investigated, 
such as movements in commodity pricesTP
75





In the spirit of these different models, the following empirical relationship was estimated 
using quarterly data, from 1990 through 2001. 
 
t t t t t RELCOM DEF NFA RELP REER 4 3 2 1 0 α α α α α + + + + =   
Where 
REER = real effective (trade-weighted) exchange rate, with an increase of REER denoting an appreciation. 
The trade weighting used are the average weighting for Argentina ten largest trading partners from 1990 to 
2001. The variable is in log. 
RELP = Relative sector prices, proxied by the indexed trade-weighted ratio of relative prices between 
Argentina and its main trading partners. The trade weighting used are the same as for REER and the 
variable is in log. 
NFA = net foreign assets, proxied by the ratio of net foreign assets of the banking system to M2. TP
77
PT 
DEF = fiscal balance, as percentage of GDP. 
RELCOM = Real commodity prices, proxied in this case by nominal Soy prices deflated by the MUV 
index, a composite index of the prices for manufactured exports from the G5 countriesTP
78
PT. The variable is in 
log. 
 
It is expected that α1 > 0 and α2 > 0, but the sign of α3 is not a priori clear-cut. Although 
a fiscal balance improvement is likely to be associated with a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate (because spending reduction may negatively affect domestic consumption 
of non-tradables and this lead to an decline in the price of the latter), a case can be made 
for a long-run real appreciation, as the positive net foreign assets generated by the initial 
real depreciation (as evidenced by a current account surplus) would have to be offset by a 
                                                 
TP
74
PT See ROGOFF [1996] for a survey. 
TP
75
PT See CAHSIN, CESPEDES & SAHAY [2002]. 
TP
76
PT See MCDONALD & RICCI [2003]. 
TP
77
PT An alternative, and more common, way to normalize net foreign assets is to use GDP.   
TP
78
PT The MUV series was extrapolated using annual data.   52
long run trade deficit (thus implying real appreciation). Finally, α4 is expected to be 
positive, as higher commodity prices tends to drive up wages, thus leading to an increase 




In order to investigate the existence of a long-run relationship among the model variables, 
the Johansen maximum likelihood estimation technique is used, through a vector error-
correction specification. It is assumed that REER fluctuates around its long-term value, 
the four variables in the system are decomposed into transitory and permanent 
components, using the GONZALO & GRANGER [1995] decomposition. In this context, the 
first step is the investigate the order of integration of all variables entering the model. As 
shown in Table A1.1, all variables are I(1) at the 1% level. 
 
Table A1.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
Variable Name  Lag length  ADF Statistics  1% level  5% level  10% level 
REER  5  -1.26 -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
dREER  4  -4.44*  -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
RELP  1  -2.06 -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
dRELP  3  -4.344*  -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
NFA  1  -2.95 -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
dNFA  0  -11.53*  -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
DF  4  -1.92 -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
dDF  5  -5.52*  -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
RELCOM  0  -1.57 -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
dRELCOM  0  -10.95*  -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
(*) Denotes the rejection of the null-hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% significance level. 
Lag order determined using the Schwartz criterion. 
 
The results reported in Table A1.2 show evidence of one cointegrating vector, suggesting 
a long term relationship between the real exchange rate, relative prices, real commodity 
prices, net foreign assets and the fiscal balance taking the following form: 
 
DEF RELCOM NFA RELP REER 55 . 0 04 . 0 19 . 1 27 . 0 + + + =  
 
As expected, both the relative prices ratio and net foreign assets are positively correlated 
to the real exchange rate. The magnitude of the coefficients is also roughly consistent 
with those results of comparable studies in OECD countriesTP
80
PT: a 1% increase in the 
relative price ratio (higher non-tradable prices) is associated with a less than proportional 
real exchange rate appreciation (0.2%) while a 1% increase in net foreign assets is 
associated with an appreciation of the exchange rate of a little more than 1%. The size of 
the real commodity prices coefficient is quite small, probably reflecting the fact that only 
one commodity is present in the index (soy). The sign of the fiscal balance coefficient 
implies that budget deficits are associated with long run appreciation, which is 
theoretically consistent under certain conditions, as discussed before. The speed of 
adjustment between the real exchange rate and its long term equilibrium value, as 
measured by the error correction term reported in Table A1.2, is of 0.17, implying that 
that about 20% of the gap is eliminated every quarter and that full adjustment takes place 
                                                 
TP
79
PT See CAHSIN, CESPEDES & SAHAY [2002]. 
TP
80
PT See ALBERLOLA et alt. [1999].  within six quarters in the absence of other shocks). This seems to be relatively fast, and 
would imply the existence of large deviations. Given the different shocks which hit 
Argentina in the 1990s, this assumption is certainly plausible.  
 
Table A1.2. Johansen Cointegration Tests 
 
Eigenvalue  Likelihood 5 Percent  1 Percent  Hypothesized 
Lag order=3  Ratio  Critical Value Critical Value No. of CE(s) 
 0.354217   70.36348   59.46   66.52        None ** 
 0.258360   38.44123   39.89   45.58     At most 1 
 0.142887   16.62216   24.31   29.75     At most 2 
 0.060873   5.366578   12.53   16.31     At most 3 
 0.010653   0.781850    3.84    6.51     At most 4 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) significance level 
 
Table A1.3. Normalized Cointegrating Coefficients* 
 
Standardized  REER RELP NFA DEF  RELCOM 
eigenvector '  1 -0.279233 -1.194019 -0.546936 -0.042169
 Lag order=3 
 Std Error  0.04548 0.12975 0.15750 0.00365
ECM Representation  D(REER)      
        
CointEq1  0.172379    
Std error  0.06680    
T-Ratio  (2.58068)    
D(REER(-1))  -0.368866    
Std error  0.16004    
T-Ratio  (-2.30483)    
D(REER(-3))  -0.300675     
Std error  0.14857     
T-Ratio  (2.02377)     
D(DEF(-1))  0.079465     
Std error  0.03455     
T-Ratio  (2.29982)     
      
 R-squared  0.303702    
 Adj. R-squared  0.120465    
(*)Only statistically significant lagged difference terms are reported in the interest of space 
 
Using the long-term cointegrating vector as well as the short run deviations of the ECM 
representation reported in the above table, the real exchange rate can be decomposed into 
permanent and transitory components, following GONZALO & GRANGER[1995], thereby 
combining I(1) and I(0) elements. As can be seen from Chart A1.1, which plots the actual 
real exchange rate as well as its theoretical long-run value taking into account short-
deviations, the equilibrium exchange rate exhibited significant variations during the 
1980s, reflecting erratic economic policy and external shocks. During the 1990s (Chart 
A1.1b), the most notable deviations were around the time of the Mexican crisis as well as 
during the 1998-2001 period. It is during that last period that the divergence grew, ending 
  53up with a significant overvaluation. The overvaluation implied by the gap between the 
actual and the equilibrium exchange rate is of 20% at the end of 2001(Chart A1.2). This 
appears to be less than the 40-50% suggested by ALBEROLA et alt. [2003] in the context 
of a similar exercise conducted with annual data between 1965 and 2001, but this may 
reflect different model specifications and samples
81.  
 
Chart A1.1. Actual and Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates 
 










































































































































































































                                                 
81 In particular, the specification used by ALBEROLA et alt [2003] does not include real commodity prices 
and fiscal balance.  
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ANNEX II 
 
Debt sustainability analysis 
 
Following HINH T. DINH [1999], let us define fiscal sustainability as the one-condition 
such that solvency can be assured in the future. The budget constraint of the public sector 




∗ ∗ + + = + ⋅ + M B E B B ER B R D        ( 1 )  
 
Where    D is the primary fiscal deficit 
    R is the nominal interest rate paid on domestic debt 
    R* is the nominal interest rates paid on foreign debt 
    B is the public sector’s domestic debt and B* is the public sector’s foreign debt 
E is the nominal exchange rate 
    M is the monetary base 
   & xx x tt =− −1  
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, π depicting the rate of inflation and y the real GDP 
Note that the last term of the equation comes from the standard quantity theory of money, 
assuming that velocity is constant.     
 
Defining i as the real domestic interest rate and i* as the real foreign interest rate, and 
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Defining the public sector sustainability criterion as  0 = =
• •
φ δ , equation (4) can be 
reformulated as (4)’, which shows that the primary deficit could be financed in a 
sustainable way either if growth is greater than the interest rate paid on domestic debt, or 
if export growth exceeds depreciation adjusted foreign interest rates, or in using the 
inflation tax (the unique revenue-maximizating rate of inflation being equal to the inverse 

















































π φ δ      (4)’ 
 
In the specific case of Argentina under the Convertibility Plan, equation (4)’ can be 
further streamlined by eliminating the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate, and by 
treating the last term of the equation as marginal given the absence of possible use of the 
inflation tax. Thus, the necessary primary surplus compatible with debt sustainability at a 
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